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Abstract
The frequently disorganized command structure which dictated American Civil War battles often resulted
in direction of military strategy being passed over into the junior officer ranks. These volunteer leaders
fought directly with the regular volunteer soldier that filled the ranks of both Union and Confederate
armies. In exchange for their position amongst the common volunteer, the junior officers shared the same
dangers in combat as their subordinates. In this study, junior officers Rufus Dawes and James Cooper
Nisbet serve as the focus of a study that reveals what attributes contributed to the success and failures of
command. Dawes, who served in the Union Army, ascended the junior officer ranks and eventually
achieved a higher command as the war reached its zenith. A similar direction was also taken by Nisbet,
who served in the formidable Confederate Army, and in the closing months of the war, found himself in
regimental command, as well as an interim brigade commander. These young men can owe their success
in high-command to their time in the junior officer ranks. The lessons learned in the early battles of the
Civil War, assisted in their understanding of what characteristics and ideas worked in leadership, and what
choices were appropriate for present combat situations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Students of the American Civil War hardly have trouble locating stories of commanding officers
who triumphantly parade through the annals of American history. General Ulysses S. Grant, William T.
Sherman, Philip Sheridan, and even contentious and defeated Confederate commanders such as General
Robert E. Lee, Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson and JEB Stewart have anchored themselves as staples of
pride in American culture. Such stories of these rebel commanders fighting against often insurmountable
odds, yet constantly exiting early Civil War battles as victorious, is in every way as American as anyone
could imagine. For that reason, many students of the war have latched on to these rebel leaders just
because American history is an underdog story and these Americans in rebellion did for their “freedom”
and “rights” as underlings. Though this present and popular view is often misinterpreted into a misguided
approach at understanding the Civil War, the popularity and fascination of Confederate leaders remains
unrivaled to many American heroes.
As complex as Civil War history can be, some of the most intriguing and interesting aspects
resonate in a relatively untapped source of information. Presently, if one were to gaze across one of the
many National Battlefield Parks, silhouettes of equestrian statues, domes, and pyramids seemingly clutter
miles of statutorily protected terrain. Mostly, these monuments are set in memory of Union and
Confederate leaders that have influenced students of the conflict for generations. Many visitors of these
parks unintentionally neglect to work their way off the beaten paths (which is allowed in most areas of the
parks) and into the battlefield. However, if students do find themselves navigating the labyrinth of these
parks, they are likely to cross a cenotaph of a fallen junior officer, or a stele of a regiment that fought
valiantly for their own survival. Much like these concealed markers, the junior officer and his small unit
who fought and gave their lives for their beliefs indicative of their country at the time, are often tragically
left undiscovered. Their stories hold the reasoning of why a battle’s outcome occurred or a catastrophic
failure resulted. Consequently many of these junior officers would contribute to a battle’s failure,
especially in the first years of the Civil War.
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Before delving into an analyzation of the importance of the junior officer, what exactly is a junior
officer? Junior officers are majors, captains, and lieutenants, and other field officers, junior to general
staff, who often dictated and directed the flow of a Civil War battle.1 Usually leading by example in the
thick of the fight, most Civil War officers tallied up an absurdly excessive fatality rate throughout the
conflict.2 Junior officers who survived such intense combat often assisted in defining Civil War battles.
They successfully assisted in so by fighting smartly and intelligently. Military regulations designed for
Civil War officers required them to lead from the front. Often mounted in order to grasp a clear view of
the combat to their front, these junior officers were subjected to relentless and devastating fire from the
enemy.3 As the war accelerated into a virtual bloodbath, many junior officers learned to adapt to the fight
at hand rather than follow the “Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics” tactics regulated by the War Department.4
However, even in adapting to the ebbs and flows of battle, wounds and close calls consistently barraged
these officers. It took a special kind of discipline to clearly execute commands while under the stress and
fatigue of constant campaigning. The Battle of Second Manassas is an instance where junior officers
added themselves, mostly unintentionally, in great numbers to the casualty list. Many fell by simply doing
what was expected of them.
On August 30,1862, Major General Fitz John Porter ordered his V Corps forward at 3:30 pm.5
The objective of the Federal force was an unfinished railroad cut tucked behind a belt of woods. This
position was about a mile or so to their immediate front. Before the advance, many of the officers in
disobedience with the officer handbook, wisely dismounted and opted to lead their units on foot. The
open ground ahead proved to positively expose those officers who remained on horseback. Yet, some

1

Colonels, though considered a junior officer, frequently rose to brigade command during the Civil War. The position of brigade
commander would therefore categorized these colonels as general staff, not of junior officer grade.
2 Jenny Goellnitz, “Statistics on the Civil War and Medicine,” The Ohio State University, accessed May 19, 2019,
https://ehistory.osu.edu/exhibitions/cwsurgeon/cwsurgeon/statistics. According to The Ohio State University department of
history: “1 Army commander, 3 corps commanders, 14 division commanders, and 67 brigade commanders, including 32 generals,
were killed in the Union Army.” “1 Army Commander, 3 Corps commanders, 7 division commanders, and 62 brigade
commanders were killed in the CSA Army.”
3 Hardee, William Joseph. Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics: For the Exercise and Maneuvers of Troops When Acting as Light
Infantry or Riflemen. Prepared Under the Direction of the War Department, Volume 1. (Philadelphia: J.B Lippencott & Co,1860),
p 8. “The field officers, colonel, lieutenant colonel and major are supposed to be mounted, and on active service shall be on
horseback.”
4 Hardee, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics, p 108. “…the instructor will then place himself twenty-five paces in front of them (the
battalion)…” A recklessly exposed position.
5 Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993),
339.
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remained in the saddle, in seeming wanton ignorance of the obvious danger that presented itself to those
commanders. Colonel Edward Frisby of the Thirtieth New York Infantry found himself as the vanguard of
the assault. At this point, the war is still relatively young. Inexperience and bravado still plagued the mind
of many officers, junior and senior alike. Leading by example still proved to be the top priority of the
junior officer. Colonel Frisby thought for this attack to succeed, his men must see him at the front of his
regiment, a sort-of compliance to Hardee’s handbook.6 Thusly, he remained mounted as the New Yorkers
stepped off shortly after 4:00 pm.
Upon emerging from the small belt of woods, the Upstaters could see the Confederates under
Colonel Leroy Stafford prone against the banks of the ‘Deep Cut’. 7 Suddenly a devastating volley tore
into the New Yorkers from the Rebel defenders. Colonel Frisby jolted in his saddle. A bullet had found its
mark and tore away part of his lower jaw. Clutching his mangled face he would away help from Major
Morgan Chrysler, stammering for him to go back to his post.8 Gathering whatever remaining energy he
had left, Colonel Frisby spurred his mount on, still thinking that the importance of his position at the head
of the advance meant everything to his men. Just then another impeccably aimed volley from the
Confederates roared across the front of the New Yorkers. Colonel Edward Frisby toppled from his horse,
after a ball smashed square into his forehead. 9 The importance of smartly leading a unit in such a battle is
crucial in the success of that attack, especially in the prolific turmoil that quickly develops in combat. The
attack at the Deep Cut soon stalled and was repulsed mainly due to communication issues in the
command structure.10 One smart possibility of the failure of the attack is due to many of the officers
falling at the head of their commands before the objective was even reached. In turn, the immediate
breakdown of regimental command was dooming many of the advancing Federal regiments even before
the chance respond to the Confederates was given. Nonetheless, though in such an unfortunate
circumstance, Colonel Frisby was indeed following the tactics and regulations that were demanded of
6

Hardee, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics, p 8. Entree 27 states: “The colonel will take post thirty paces in rear of the file closers,
and opposite the center of the battalion. This Distance will be reduced whenever there is a reduction the front of the battalion.”
Colonel Frisby elected to be positioned thirty paces in-front of his line, rather than behind. A common practice of the colonel
during the early stages of the war.
7 Hennessy, Return to Bull Run, 341.
8 Rufus W. Clark, “Heroes of Albany”, accessed May 19, 2019, https://albany.nygenweb.net/bio-157.htm. Hennessy, Return to Bull
Run, 341-342.
9 Clark, “Heroes of Albany.” Hennessy, Return to Bull Run, 342.
10 Ibid., 352.
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field officers in that time. Later, the importance of observation, common sense and scrambling for
survival would rule supreme, rather than following a dated military hand book.
Two celebrated and well-known junior officers that took full advantage of disregarding common
battlefield tactics of that time were Colonel John Brown Gordon and Colonel Joshua Lawrence
Chamberlain. Each man held the remarkable ability to smartly lead through confused combat situations as
well as serving the duration of the war with a consistent enthusiasm towards command excellence. Both
Gordon and Chamberlain volunteered their services to “country” with no pervious military training. Each
man went on to most deservingly obtain the rank of general in their respective armies, only after
repeatedly showing incredible leadership skills in combat. Their climb to Civil War legend began in the
junior officer ranks. To understand what influenced many a junior officer’s evolution in tactical ideology,
a separate examination of these two military phenoms finest strategic moments is necessary.
By mid-morning on September 17, 1862, the Battle of Antietam had been already raging for
hours while each side had fought to a bloody stalemate on General Robert E. Lee’s left flank. A
breakdown in the Union II Corps command persuaded General William B. French to advance his Federal
division far to his left and directly towards Lee’s center, which was arguably the Confederate’s strongest
defensive position. The pinnacle of the Confederate center was a sunken farm lane. This well-traversed
lane now served as an outstanding defensive position for Confederate brigades under Generals George B.
Anderson and Robert Rodes.11
Colonel John Gordon’s Sixth Alabama found itself directly in the center of this sunken lane.12 To
Colonel Gordon’s right was a dip in the terrain, a gathering of trees, a walking trail and then the ground
began to rise considerably for thirty yards to the front of the sunken farm lane. To Colonel Gordon’s left,
where the regiment’s defense began, the topography presented itself identically, sans a small gathering of
trees. Although the gently rising ground to his front caused problems for his position, Colonel Gordon had
immense confidence in his battle-tested veterans. So much so that the excited Colonel Gordon sharply

11

Robert K. Krick, “It Appeared As Though Mutual Extermination Would Put a Stop to the Awful Carnage: Confederates in
Sharpsburg’s Bloody Lane.” in The Antietam Campaign, ed. Gary W. Gallagher, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1999), 223-258.
12 Krick, “Confederates in Sharpsburg’s Bloody Lane,” 229.The Sixth Alabama was part of General Robert Rodes brigade.
Rodes’ brigade held the center of the sunken lane. His regiments aligned as followed: Left to right, Twenty-Sixth Ala. Twelfth
Ala. Third Ala. Fifth Ala. Sixth Ala.
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commented towards General Lee and his staff “These men are going to stay here, General, till the sun
goes down or victory is won!” 13 Colonel Gordon’s words eventually turned out to haunt the regiment. The
position the Sixth Alabama held was at most, precarious. “My troops held the most advanced position on
this part of the field,” Colonel Gordon stated later in his explanation of the battle. “It was evident…that
my small force was to receive the first impact of the expected charge…” 14 Colonel Gordon mapped out
his plan first by observation. Though he did hold a decently formidable position, his regiment was
nonetheless exposed. The queer sunken road protruded into a vulnerable salient position for the
Confederates. The lane arched from a slight arrow point, slightly retreating back from the Sixth
Alabama’s position at the point. The high ground at his front would also do him no favors. The Federals
had the ability to shoot down into the sunken lane if they elected to stay put atop the crest of the ridge to
the Confederate front. Fortunately for Gordon, the Federals failed to realize the Confederate flaw for at
least and hour before exposing the fatal flaw. Colonel Gordon attempted to reconnoiter the position to his
front a bit more, however his strategizing became interrupted by a line of blue advancing towards his
immediate front.
Colonel Gordon was forced to improvise. The front line of the advancing Union troops “…came
to a charge bayonets…”15 informing Colonel Gordon that the enemy’s rifles were not loaded. The
Federals intended to push right into the sunken lane without pausing to fire. The Federals specifically
relied on their large regiments who could push their way through the center of the Alabama brigade with
overwhelming force. Gordon understood that and reflected upon memory that the Sixth Alabama had
usually been the ones advancing on a formidable enemy position. He knew what the Federal plan was and
now it was he who had to “…stand fast, holding the centre under whatever pressure and against any
odds.”16
Colonel Gordon now had to make his final decision, and fast. Should he fire on the Federal lines,
now only one hundred yards distant? No, not yet, he calculated. At one hundred yards, Colonel Gordon

13

Gordon, John B. Reminiscences of the Civil War. (San Bernardino: First Rate Publishers, 2018), 41.
Gordon, Reminiscences, 41.
Ibid.
16 Ibid.
14
15

INTRODUCTION

6

could now see white gaiters on the pressing Federals’ ankles.17 At this point, as a veteran of two major
campaigns, Colonel Gordon knew the Federals well and correctly observed that no veteran soldier would
wear such an unnecessary and uncomfortable piece of gear during campaigning season. Those Federals
had to have been raw troops, fresh from the Washington D.C. parade grounds. Colonel Gordon was
correct. General Max Weber’s green brigade has never seen combat before, and the Sixth Alabama was
about to “…turn loose a sheet of fire and lead into their faces.”18 Knowing very well that his foe would
collapse after such a deviating fire at close range, ostentatiously Colonel Gordon stood at the center of his
prone line and waited until the Federals were yards away before giving the command to fire. Without
waisting another second, the Sixth Alabama unleashed a horrific volley that knocked the whole Federal
front line down “with a few exceptions” in a “…consuming blast.” 19 Due to the devastating effect of the
volley, the opposing Federals broke and ran to reform out of sight, only to reform and attempt to dislodge
the Confederates once more.
Colonel Gordon’s observation of terrain and knowledge of his enemy had assisted him in his
tactical choices. If he had let his soldiers fire before the advancing Federals were within sufficient range,
the momentum of the advance would more than likely overwhelm the Sixth Alabama’s soldiers
attempting to reload their rifles. However, the success of his Alabamians eventually dwindled into an
inevitable disaster. As Colonel John B. Gordon strode defiantly along his veterans in his trademarked
perfect and erect posture, four balls would find their mark upon the exuberant Colonel.20 A fifth finally
knocked the stubborn man unconscious. As Colonel Gordon’s men carried him from the now Bloody
Lane, the tide had turned against the Confederates who stubbornly held the lane. Union forces finally
broke the difficult defense and poured into the center of General Robert E. Lee’s exhausted and depleted
army. If not for the Federals notorious incompetence of high command, the day might have been lost for
the Confederates and Colonel John Gordon’s apparent mortal wounds might have been acquired
superfluously.

17

Gordon, Reminiscences, 42.
Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983), 237-238.
Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Current, Richard N, et al. Encyclopedia of the Confederacy. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 696-697.
18
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Yet Colonel John Gordon lived and to this day is recognized as one of the more successful
Confederate generals during the war. Attributing much of what he experienced in the Bloody Lane to his
success as a leader of men. Gordon reiterates in his memoirs that the Battle of Antietam “… left its lasting
impress upon my body as well as upon my memory.”21 Almost a year later, Colonel John Gordon’s
intellectual doppelgänger would etch his legacy into an obscure hilltop and ultimately into the annals of
the United States Military Academy.
Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain who valiantly lead the Twentieth Maine Volunteer
Infantry through many of the Army of the Potomac’s infamous battles, is well known in Civil War lore of
as the “Lion of Little Round Top.”22 Colonel Chamberlain’s quick thinking and overall incredible
attention to detail in the face of sure defeat, would contribute to the preservation of the Army of the
Potomac on the evening of July 2, 1863. Colonel Chamberlain would separate himself from many of the
average junior officers through the show of courage, determination and tactical skill.23 The prowess he
showed in the ability to quickly learn military tactics was thinking short of phenomenal. Undoubtedly, the
battle of Little Round Top at Gettysburg would be the Twentieth Maine and Colonel Chamberlain’s finest
hour. In the late afternoon of July 2, 1863, Colonel Chamberlain and the Twentieth Maine would be
posted on the extreme Union left near the saddle of two rocky hills named Little and Big Round Top.
Almost immediately upon placement, General James Longstreet’s seemingly crushing assault reached the
Union left as an Alabama tide began to roll across the Twentieth Maine’s front.
For hours, repeated attacks by Colonel William C. Oates’ Fifteenth Alabama attempted to
overwhelm the exhausted Twentieth Maine, yet the incredibly resilient backwoodsmen refused the
Alabamians constant assaults. However, Colonel Chamberlain noticed the stubborn Mainers began to
fatigue. The extreme heat and choking smoke, held in place by the thick canopy of foliage that covered
the slopes, did not pair well with a dwindling ammunition supply or the willpower of the relentless
Confederate force.

21
22

Gordon, Reminiscences, 40.
Through many historians are keen and quick to attack General Chamberlain’s recollections of battle as well as rightly question
his personal accounts of his accolades; his ability to successfully command as a junior officer and later, a general officer, cannot
be disregarded as anything but successful.
23 Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. (New York: Touchstone, 1968), 393.
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There was no way the Twentieth Maine could hold off another frontal assault by the seemingly unfazed
Fifteenth Alabama. In accordance with his keen understanding of the situation at his immediate front,
Colonel Chamberlain decided to “refuse” the Confederate line. He did this by bending his regiment at a
right angle, preventing the constant flanking maneuver attempted by Colonel Oates and his Alabamians.
Colonel Chamberlain then sent Captain Walter G. Morrill’s Company B to take position behind a low
stonewall to the left of the Twentieth Maine’s position.24 This maneuver would support the Twentieth
Maine’s main firing line on their left flank while providing a devastating fire to the right flank of the
unsuspecting Fifteenth Alabama. However this positioning would only hold out for so long. The wellpositioned Company B could not replenish the physical and replace mental fatigue the Twentieth Maine
and the Fifteenth Alabama were experiencing. Colonel Chamberlain was running out of options. If he
were to withdraw from his position, the whole Union Army’s flank would be left in the air and exposed to
a devastating attack. Quick analysis of his Southern foe to his front determined that they too, were
exhausted from the repeated attacks. In addition to this, the hot sun and lack of water was doing neither
side favors.25 Colonel Chamberlain realized he must attempt something. The Twentieth Maine had held
onto the hillside for nearly two hours, but sensing that his men could not hold on for much longer,
Colonel Chamberlain ordered the Twentieth Maine to fix bayonets and prepare to charge. 26
Minutes later the Twentieth Maine leaped over their breastworks and into the exhausted
Alabamians. Stunned, Colonel Oates ordered a retreat, but not before Captain Morrill’s Company B stood
up and unleashed a shattering volley into the retreating Confederates.27 Consequently, the Alabamians ran
for safety to the other side of the adjoining Big Round Top. Colonel Joshua Chamberlain’s quick thinking
and decisive and tactical execution assisted in an absolute route of the enemy force. Colonel
Chamberlain’s astute understanding his men’s ability and the importance of his position for the greater
good of the Union Army assisted in his tactical decisions and moreover the Union Army’s successful

24

Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 386, 393.
Ibid., 391. Colonel Oates blamed his failure on his canteen detail that was unfortunately captured before the attacks began.
Ibid., 394. Chamberlain, Joshua L. “After Action Report: Headquarters 20th Maine Vols. Field near Gettysburg, Pa. July 6th,
1863,”accessed May 19, 2019. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/chamberlain.pdf
27 Ibid. Chamberlain, “After Action Report.”
25
26
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defense on July 2nd. All of which stated previously is only something that a junior officer could ever
know.
Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain is well known not only to students of the Civil War but also by
students of all subjects of American history. “Chamberlain” can even be considered a household name in
the United States. Consequently, with such fame, exaggerations of exploits come with the report. Students
of this conflict must be leery of both the account and a skeptic’s questions. Joshua Chamberlain could
very well have embellished a few minor details of the Twentieth Maine’s charge, but overall what lead up
to his decision to execute the now infamous order is more less undisputed. It is the charge of the
Twentieth Maine itself that has many people interjecting themselves into the lore. Personal exploits are
always of interest but ultimately rarely turn the tide of the battle. However, the command decisions that
Colonel Chamberlain made in a time of extreme turmoil and pending defeat is nothing short of
extraordinary.
Colonel John B. Gordon and Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain are the prototypical Civil War
success story. Their uncanny ability to succeed if the face of impending defeat is what makes these
soldiers unique. But what is it that made them so successful as junior officers? For one, both were
educated men. John Gordon attended the University of Georgia and then moved on to study law.
Eventually he became a newspaper editor in Milledgeville, Georgia and then a coal mine director
afterwards.28 Gordon’s ability to command and think logically through difficult predicaments could be
attributed to his many career tracks and job holdings. Given his job titles, Gordon was a man who saw it
all.
Just as his success as a military commander, Joshua Chamberlain’s accolades are those of legend.
A graduate of Bowden College and Bangor Theological Seminary, Chamberlain is believed to have
known up to nine foreign languages as well as a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Eventually he would become
a professor of rhetoric at Bowden College. Obviously extremely intelligent, and what some may judge as
an overachiever, Chamberlain was destined to champion military command.29 But, were there junior

28
29

1.

Current, et all. Encyclopedia of the Confederacy, 696-697.
Wallace, Willard M. Soul of the Lion: A Biography of General Joshua L. Chamberlain, (New York: T. Nelson, 1960), Chapter

INTRODUCTION

10

officers who were not fortunate enough to be inherently gifted in education that conducted themselves
similarly in combat? And if so, did their post war upbringing prepare them for the horrors of war? Were
they also able to readily combat difficult situations just as the military phenoms John B. Gordon and
Joshua Chamberlain were adept in doing? The short answer is yes to all of these questions. However, we
must delve into the minds of lesser known junior officers in order to achieve the answers to these
questions. To appreciate the importance of the junior officer in combat, is to understand the ever-changing
combat philosophy as the American Civil War droned on. But where did volunteer field officers learn to
smartly lead? The answer is less complex than we may think. The junior officer educated themselves
within the ranks of the enlisted man. Our search for these answers leads us to two men from two
completely different walks of life. In 1861 Madison, Wisconsin and Dade Country, Georgia could not be
further apart.
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Chapter 2: The Roots of Leadership

To become a respected leader of soldiers is not an easy task and in order to be a successful
commander, integrity, discipline, intelligence and acceptance are all traits that were toted at every juncture
of command. However, as each of those traits are all absolute and equally important in command, a
soldier’s acceptance of an officer can be argued as the most vital attribute. At the outbreak of the Civil
War, the standard idea shared between the enlisted volunteers was the notion of equality with their
immediate superiors. Quite often, the volunteer knew of the junior officer placed in command of their
unit, and in all likeliness found themselves frequently involved in the same predicaments that
accompanied military life.30 Yet commonly, many of these aspiring leaders likely found themselves in
such positions of command in due to the officer’s social status in their communities.
Consequently, a large demand for volunteers to enlist at the outbreak of the Civil War, in effect
diluted the junior officer pool, and resulted in many appointments of junior officers who were not fit for
the pressures of command. John D. Billings of the Tenth Massachusetts Battery noted of early junior
officers: “…the result often was officers who were diamonds in the rough, but liberally intermingled with
veritable clod-hoppers (foolish individuals) whom a brief experience in active service soon sent to the
rear.”31 Thereby, a commonly shared perspective by the enlisted man caused, in many cases a discomfort
in command for many junior officers. To infuse discipline into the ranks, let alone gain any sort of
acceptance from the volunteer, became one of the most difficult uphill battles the junior officer had to
fight. However to counter this, the idea of leading by example more often than not won over many the
volunteers in a combat unit. Heroics in an engagement did however resinate in a very positive manor in
the eyes of the volunteer soldier, but as previously noted with the tragic outcome of Colonel Frisby at
Second Manassas, the result of reckless bravado more often than not, end in a deadly demise for that
junior officer.
Besides heroism in battle, a sentiment that could sway the most difficult solider is the junior
officer sharing commonalties with the enlisted man. While sharing the same beliefs and social

30

Linderman, Gerald F. Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in The American Civil War. (New York: Macmillan, Inc.
1989), 37.
31 Billings, John D. Hardtack and Coffee: The Unwritten Story of Army Life. (Los Angeles: Enhanced Media Publishing, 2016),
17.
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backgrounds, camaraderie did ultimately evolve rapidly as the average Civil War solider spent most of his
time encamped and surrounded by contemporaries and officers alike. The necessity to understand what a
respected junior officer could contribute to a soldier’s attitude and confidence. A pair of junior officers
who often shared a similar tendency of successful leadership in battle, resilient camaraderie with their
unit, a common ideological approach, and a display of constant psychical rectitude; are Captain James
Cooper Nisbet, CSA and Major Rufus R. Dawes, USA. These two leaders that evolved into extremely
competent leaders of men over the early years of the Civil War. Eventually, each junior officer advanced
into a position of regimental command, a feat that could not have been accomplished for many volunteer
junior officers without learning to command on their own accord in the darkest hours of the Civil War.
While following Captain Nisbet and Major Dawes through their most difficult and trying moments as
junior officers, their command decisions, ability to adapt and calmly execute orders under stress, as well
as observing their rare ability to clearly navigate through an intense and chaotic situation, can lead to an
answer of how and why these seemingly average men, tossed into a heavily diluted and sophomoric
officer pool, became successful combat leaders.
In 1856, James Nisbet was seventeen years old and a recent high school graduate out of Rome,
Georgia. At average height with piercing blue eyes and light brown hair, Nisbet must have stuck many as
a handsome man, and according to his high level of literacy, displayed a willingness and eagerness to
understand and learn. Upon taking his fervor for education to Oglethorpe University, he excelled in his
studies and graduated college in three years at the age of twenty in 1859.32 James Nisbet showed an
extreme interest in his families lineage and also of world history and affairs. The Nisbet’s could trace their
family roots all the way back to Scotland’s epic battles led by William of Orange, and eventually to the
climatic battle of Bothwell’s Bridge. Where in 1679 his personal hero, Captain John Nisbet of the Army
of the Covenant was captured and eventually executed in 1685 for treason. 33 The stories of his warrior
ancestors resonated early in James Cooper Nisbet’s psyche. Nisbet constantly reiterates in his memoirs
that the “Scotch-Irish” were the cultivators of Southern heritage and “specifically, the rank and file of the

32
33

Nisbet, James Cooper. Four Years on The Firing Line. (Chattanooga: Imperial Press, 1914), 17-19.
Nisbet, Four Years on The Firing Line, 7.
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Southern armies boasted some of the best blood on earth.” 34 As the troubles with the British became
supererogatory, the Nisbet clan eventually immigrated from Scotland, settling in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. James Cooper Nisbet’s grandfather, James Nisbet II (James Cooper Nisbet’s namesake)
graduated from Jefferson College in Philadelphia in 1730 and took his medical practice to North
Carolina. 35 Ultimately, James Alexander Nisbet, the young James Cooper Nisbet’s father, settled into a
law practice in Macon, Georgia, where James Cooper Nisbet would call his home until the outbreak of
war.
Nisbet’s interest in history and his intense pride in his Scottish heritage undoubtedly sculpted his
personal ideology of the United States. He never once stated on record any distain or contempt for the
Northerner, even following the most grueling combat one could experience. Nisbet especially respected
Pennsylvanians, most likely due to his family’s ties to Philadelphia and the large Scotch-Irish
demographic that settled in western Pennsylvania. He generously offered his subjective yet interesting
opinion on the influx of Scotch-Irish volunteers into the Union Army. He asserted that the incursion of
these Scotch-Irish into the Union Army would ultimately seal the Confederate State’s fate: “When this
Scotch blood gave its impulse to the Union Armies after 1862, it poured in from Western Pennsylvania,
Indiana, Illinois… it did more to turn the tide of battle which at first set in favor of the South…”36
Nisbet’s understanding of Northern culture was accompanied with a bit of respect. His usage of “Civil
War” to describe the conflict rather than the common Southern verbality of “War of Northern Aggression”
or “Yankee Invasion of The South” often used by many Confederate veterans post-war, demonstrates
Nisbet’s ability to adapt to the change within his Southern culture, even following the outcome of the
Civil War.
However, as a slaveholder before the Civil War, Nisbet displayed an inability to compromise in
his differences with the African-American race. Thus, his seemingly impressive adaptive ability to change
could not effectively sway his strong Southern beliefs. Reflecting upon his idea that former slaves and
freedmen were his inferior, even after the conclusion of war, Nisbet would record: “I have studied the
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full-blooded negro, under the most favorable circumstances as slaves and freed-men. I find it impossible
to disagree with the scientific conclusion that he is an inferior species of the human race.”37 As many
Southerners did post-Civil War, Nisbet, like many other Confederate veterans, struggled with adapting to
the idea of the integration of African-Americans into Southern culture. The staunch Southern ideology of
the day did not allow most to accept these changes in their lifetime. But unlike most of his
contemporaries, Nisbet did admit, before his passing: “No one could read the record (the history of the
Civil War), and refuse to admit that slavery was abolished in the province of God; because its purpose
was accomplished; the time was ripe for its cessation.”38 Nisbet’s thoughts of slavery never substantially
influenced his decision to fight in the Civil War. Unfortunately, Nisbet is undeniably guilty of embracing
the ignorance of the popular Southern ideology of the day. Though later on in life, upon relenting that the
“cessation” of slavery was necessary, it can be interpreted as an attempt to adapt to the changing cultural
landscape in the reconstruction-era South. With that relenting statement, Nisbet showed more adaptability
than most of his brethren cared to show in the wake of reconstruction. It is acceptable to theorize that his
feelings of social matters in the south were maturely accepted and shared with many of his men he
commanded in battle.
In 1860, James Cooper Nisbet left his cattle farm in Dade County, Georgia, to observe his sister’s
graduation from Abbott’s College in New York. He took in all of the Northern sentiment of the upcoming
election and recollected that “the agitation which had been going of for sixty years culminated in the
election of Lincoln…” Nisbet went back home to Georgia to tell of his observances of the Democratic
party split to his friends. Most of them already familiar with the news, offered their unabashed disgust and
refusal to “stand that” towards young James. Intrigued yet seemingly indifferent to this divide, he
responded casually “then… there will be war.” 39 Nisbet was unquestionably observing the crowd of
friends. He knew he eventually had to choose a path in this seemingly inevitable war. As he calculated the
matter, James Cooper Nisbet tried to sort through the rush of thoughts running through his mind: Should
he join the manic crowd clamoring for secession? The idea seemed grand, but the underlying thought that
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caused his pulse to race was the very reality that he could be killed before his twenty-first birthday. Was
his life worth the defense of his home?
Far away in Juneau County, Wisconsin, similar thoughts were filtering through the mind of a
twenty-two years old aspiring businessman named Rufus Dawes. Dawes was just as fortunate as James
Nisbet to come from a family of American prestige. His great-grandfather, William Dawes, who along
with Paul Revere, warned many colonists of the approaching British army in 1775. Frequenting between
Ohio and Wisconsin during his teenage years, Dawes attended the University of Wisconsin in Madison
but eventually finished his studies at Marietta College in Ohio, graduating in 1860.40 As the fanaticism of
war reached its apex in early 1861, Dawes recalled: “Nothing beyond the opportunity (of going to war)
was asked.” His fear, like countless other young men, both North and South was that the war might be
over before most young men had the chance to prove their patriotism and mettle in combat. To these spry
young men “… some one else would get ahead and crush the rebellion before they got there.”41 Rufus
Dawes was red with patriotism and the coming war put his enthusiasm to the test.
Noted Iron Brigade historian Alan T. Nolan, who abridged Rufus Dawes’ recollections of the
Civil War in A Full Blown Yankee of The Iron Brigade: Service With The Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers,
states that Dawes “…called himself an Abolitionist…”42 The issue Dawes himself held with the
establishment of slavery in the South was indeed shared by many others in his unit. Wisconsin, being as
north as one could get at that time in American history, was full of immigrant stock. Mainly consisting of
German and Scandinavian decent, these hearty people were accustom to hard work, seemingly
insurmountable odds, and the daily task of fending for themselves. A slave somewhere in the South,
practically a world a way from those European immigrants, could not help them through a rough winter,
or assist in tending their land, which they cleared, planted and farmed by themselves with nothing but the
will and goal of prosperity. Freedom was the ultimate American dream for these formally persecuted
immigrants, and though thousands of miles away, every man deserved a chance at freedom, slave or not.
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In an April 26, 1862 in a letter written outside of Fredericksburg, Virginia, Rufus Dawes
recounted that many escaped slaves flooded the Sixth Wisconsin’s camp as well as many of the
surrounding units. “No system of abolition could have swept the system (of slavery) away more
effectually than does the advance of our army” Dawes recited. As he continued to look on at the
remarkable spectacle of pseudo-freedom, he could see soldiers of another regiment throwing a fugitive
slave hunter, who was searching for a fugitive, out of their camp. Pleased with the ensuing result, Dawes
went on and assert that “thus the great question of liberty is working its own solution.” To Dawes, his
calling to service was assisting in the enabling of freedom of a race of people, and to his pleasure, the men
he fought with shared much of the same sentiment as he. Dawes closes his letter with the prediction that
“the right must, and surly will triumph in the end.”43 He believed that an invasion of the south was in the
right and absolutely necessary in the preservation of his beloved country. However, at this point in his
service Rufus Dawes and the Sixth Wisconsin had yet to have experienced active combat. Only time
would tell if the freedom of men they did not know would be worth the sacrifice of life in battle.
In April 1861, the inevitable Civil War ignited in Charleston Harbor. The call for volunteers rang
though every town, North and South. Michigan, Wisconsin’s midwestern kin, eagerly sent their first
regiments into Washington D.C. Wisconsin would follow shortly after and added their own midwest
strength to the growing numbers of Union volunteers. Three months later in early July, Rufus Dawes
made a decision. He chose to offer his life for the preservation of his country and the abolition of slavery.
As Rufus Dawes made his way through the crowded streets of Madison, Wisconsin in search of an
enlistment post, James Nisbet found himself at the foot of a coal mine at Raccoon Mountain, Dade
County, Georgia, searching for his family friend, John B. Gordon.
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Chapter 3: Influenced to Lead

James Cooper Nisbet idolized an assortment of military commanders in both the Union and
Confederate armies during the Civil War. His recollections of officers as well as battles provided a
stimulating neutral account of the conflict from his point of view. Nisbet’s thoughts are especially
intriguing considering they were collected recorded in an era where preserving Confederate memory
became the popular cornerstone for recording Civil War history. A rather rare character of a Southern man
for his time, James Nisbet proved to be a most capable and complete junior officer during his service in
the Confederate Army. His longevity as a field commander as well as his remarkable ability to regularly
emerge from battle unscathed is nothing short of astonishing. However at the outbreak of the Civil War,
James Nisbet felt as torn as any Southern man at that time. The oncoming war offered these men few
choices. In staying put at home and maintaining their livelihood, one could hope that the conflict might
resolve itself and workout to the benefit of both Northern and Southerners. But the social pressures of
proving ones worth as a masculine protector of Southern society caused many Southern men to yield to
the community and enlist into a local militia.
James Nisbet and his brother John wanted to fight for their homes, but the two were partners
together in a cattle business outside of Macon, Georgia called Cloverdale. John was only a year older than
James, and both “…had never been separated for any length of time, until the breaking out of the war.”44
The two siblings ultimately decided to draw straws and James Cooper came up short. John W. Nisbet
joined the Second Georgia Volunteer Infantry in April 1861.45 Notwithstanding to the pressures of
Georgia’s fervor for war, James Nisbet was provoked into offering his service to his home. Nisbet began
his search for the perfect unit to enlist in, finally finding his champion John B. Gordon, raising a company
of paladins equal to himself called the “Raccoon Roughs.” The unit consisted of coal minors in which
Gordon knew and employed before the idea of war resonated with them.46
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James Nisbet was very much in awe of the young Captain Gordon. Gordon and his wife, Fanny
were the Southern facsimile of the British nobility in which James Cooper Nisbet assiduously and
obsessively studied as a young man. Nisbet’s idolization of his cavalier ancestor, Captain John Nisbet
took the form of Captain John Gordon. Rather than only read upon as he could only do so about his dear
ancestor, the young Captain Gordon became someone who Nisbet could presently and directly observe.
To Nisbet, John and Fanny Gordon’s “…domestic life was ideal”47 and the enchantment the Gordon’s
would cast upon young James had a lasting effect upon his decision to join the Confederate ranks.
Though, Captain John Gordon’s great appreciation towards young James’ for his eagerness to join the
Raccoon Roughs was genuine, Nisbet recalled that Gordon “…advised me to raise a company. In that way
I could be of more service to the Confederacy”48 However disillusioned Nisbet may have been from his
rejection from service with Gordon, it was not evident. Such encouragement from Nisbet’s idol to lead on
his own, invigorated James Cooper Nisbet eagerness to serve. But not as a lowly private, as an officer.
“I am working like a beaver to get my company in active service” writes Captain Rufus Dawes to
his brother Ephraim Dawes, a then college student in Ohio. Captain Rufus Dawes in his trademark
unrelenting determination, found himself compelled to write a constant stream of letters to Wisconsin’s
Adjutant General’s office to find a place for his company. Grumbling to his brother, he had even sent “…
John Turner (influential citizen) to Madison, to see the Governor.”49 To no avail, Rufus Dawes opted to
seek guidance from one of his heroes: Captain John M. Balfour, a veteran of The Duke of Wellington’s
British Army.50 Dawes was in a panic; he did not want to miss out on squashing the rebellion. He shared
the same view as most of his sparsely recruited company that they were surly going to miss the war.
In a disturbingly prophetic antiphon, the distinguished Captain Balfour calmed the anxious
Dawes: “Don’t fret, young man, your company will be needed. Those Southern people are determined
war upon us. It will take years to put them down. You’ll see…this is no job of sixty days.” 51 Captain
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Balfour was hauntingly correct. Soon enough a letter in response to Captain Dawes near steady agitation
was received. But Dawes as ready as he was to fight, had hardly any recruits for the Lemonweir Minute
Men. Franticly the generally prepared Captain Dawes sent out recruitment posters on June 17, 1861.
Finally, after a few more weeks of agitation and anxiety, the ninety-six Lemonweir Minute Men set out
for Camp Randall in Madison, Wisconsin, led by twenty two year old Captain Rufus R. Dawes.52
Excited as he and his men were to show the Rebels “what fur,” Captain Dawes had no military
training whatsoever. The effect of this on his leadership would have been dreadful if it were not for the
fortunate circumstances in which he and his company found itself in. Upon arrival to Camp Randall, the
Lemonweir Minute Men were formed into Company K of the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry.53 The
Sixth Wisconsin’s legendary construction took place at this training ground. Fortunately, the formation
was guided by some of the most intense, able and competent officers the Union Army could muster.
The adjutant of the Sixth Wisconsin was Lieutenant Frank Haskell. One of the most well-written
and astute officers the Union Army would produce. To Dawes, Adjutant Haskell was a godsend. He took
immediate liking to Captain Dawes and assisted in turning Company K into and formidably drilled unit.
Though never a combat officer for the Sixth Wisconsin, Haskell was one of many efficient officers who
filled the junior officer corps of the Sixth Wisconsin.54 Captain Edward S. Bragg of Company E also
quickly became an influence upon the young Captain Dawes. Captain Bragg went on to distinguish
himself on many battlefields while eventually leading the Sixth Wisconsin in some of the most chaotic
moments of its Civil War tenure. Bragg would go on to secure rapid promotion but his recklessness in
combat resulted in grievous wounds. The aggressive leadership style Bragg displayed imitated that of a
bare-knuckle boxer. The relentless commander rolled up his sleeves in battle as if in a bout.55 Captain
Dawes spotlighted Bragg in combat as he attempted to absorb every aspect of his command style. Both
Dawes and Bragg were phenomenal combat leaders, and each lacked any military training before joining
the Union ranks. However, they were fortunate to have the likes of many veteran officers encompassing
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them while drilling and in combat. A few of these officers who Captain Dawes would owe to his sculpting
into a competent junior officer were Captain Adam Mallory and Lieutenant John Marsh, who were
veterans of the Mexican War. Captain Alexander S. Hooe, whose father was career regular army officer,
was a firm leader, and the two German transplant officers, Lieutenant Fred Schumacher and Lieutenant
Werner Von Bachelle served as irreplaceable role models to Dawes.56
German immigrants and veterans of many armies and wars in Europe assisted in forming the
strong core of the Sixth Wisconsin. Constant drilling and attention to detail in every formation reigned
indispensable in the preparation of unpredictable combat situations. Captain Dawes, made it a point to go
out of his way and view the instruction of his German colleagues, carefully observing the ridged and
precise discipline instilled by Lieutenant(s) Shumacher and Von Bachelle into Company F.
“The influence of this splendid company and its Lieutenants, was marked in stimulating others equal to
their performance” remarked Captain Dawes.57 Indeed, the stubbornness of the Sixth Wisconsin’s German
core manifested itself as a defining trait of the regiment and not to the chagrin of the regiments dusty and
irascible colonel, Lysander Cutler.
Cutler, a naive of Maine and a veteran of combat with Aroostook Indians was a practitioner of
education and mill work, as well as being flat broke. But the forlorn Colonel Cutler demanded discipline
from his companies. If his junior officers did not produce, they would be cashiered.58 Upon the Sixth
Wisconsin reaching the drill grounds of Washington D.C, Colonel Cutler would eliminate seven junior
officers from the ranks immediately, alienating the regiment to a man. 59 Nonetheless, Captain Dawes and
the other juniors would admire the man. The discipline he demanded would be imperative in their success
on the battlefield. As the Sixth Wisconsin was mustered into service on July 16, 1861, the unit finally
moved on to Washington D.C, then to Baltimore, and then back to Washington D.C. Outside of the
outskirts of the capital is where the Sixth Wisconsin joined the ranks of its new brigade. King’s Brigade,
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made up of the Sixth and Fifth Wisconsin and the Nineteenth Indiana, commanded by the brigade’s
namesake, Brigadier-General Rufus King.60
Down in northwestern Georgia, Captain James Nisbet finally found his company. The eager
eighty-five man roster now stood idol, waiting to be sent to the front. But Nisbet and his men would have
to wait a bit more, for “it took a political pull in those early days in 61’ to go off to war” Nisbet
complained.61 Interestingly enough, Captain Nisbet did have “political pull.” His father being a very
distinguished judge in his own Dade County, Georgia. Lamenting the decision not to ask assistance of his
father, Nisbet fortunately received a letter from his friend Algernon Hamilton who was departing for
Richmond, Virginia with his newly formed company out of Floyd County, Georgia. Nisbet jumped at the
information. He attached his eighty-five men to Hamilton’s company and departed Chattanooga,
Tennessee on June 21, 1861, bound for Richmond, Virginia. Donned in “regular United States Army
blue…” along “…with a sword and belt gifted…” from his sister and sister-in-law, Captain James Cooper
Nisbet was determined to lead to the best of his ability. 62 Arriving on the Richmond New Fair Grounds,
Company “H” was mustered into service on July 2, 1861.63 James Cooper Nisbet was now officially a
Captain in the Twenty-First Georgia Volunteer Infantry. However, for a rag-tag grouping of men, the
Twenty-first was in first-rate company with its officer corps.
Captain Nisbet’s regimental commander, Colonel John T. Mercer, was a former United States
Army Dragoon. Mercer was a competent commander, but his vice of drinking before battle proved to
hamper his ability to command his regiment. All too frequently, the command of the regiment was forced
into the hands of its junior officers. Fortunately for the regiment, these officers behaved themselves
competently on a consistent basis. Upon his disgraceful exit from command, Colonel Mercer relinquished
the command of the Twenty-First Georgia to his Adjutant Thomas Hooper. Hooper led nicely in battle but
it was Major Thomas Glover whose command skill Captain Nisbet took more of an interest in.
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Thomas Glover, a former physician in Georgia before the war, was as fearless as a warrior. The
major’s modus operandi became evident by those who served under him almost immediately in their first
engagement. Always at the head of the skirmish line, Glover and his constant straightforward nature
would demand excellence and a quick response from his men in battle. Quickness and the ability to
relentlessly advance, even under the most devastating fire, was the defining characteristic of the TwentyFirst Georgia in battle. Nisbet constantly observed Glover in battle and revered him as a critical influence
in his own leadership style. In April 1864, Major Glover was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel of the
Twenty-First Georgia. Sadly, five months later, a bullet fatally found Lieutenant-Colonel Glover at the
Battle of Winchester. It was his alleged one-hundred-seventh engagement with the unit. 64
Admittedly “not very proficient in Hardee’s Tactics,” Captain Nisbet searched for instruction of
drill around the Fair Ground.65 Soon he requisitioned a sergeant from a nearby Kentucky regiment who
Nisbet deemed “proficient” enough to instruct Company H. Nisbet’s yearning to become the best officer
he could possibly be prompted him to join the ranks with a musket to physically learn the drill formations
along side his men.66 According to Captain Nisbet, Company H consisted of “mountain” men and farm
boys. 67 The gap between the cultures of he and his rough yeoman soldiers was extensive and Nisbet knew
he would have to infuse himself into the ranks, directly, to gain their trust and respect.
But as Captain Nisbet attempted to absorb every drop of instruction on drill and leadership, the TwentyFirst Georgia’s ironically gray-cladded contemporaries were bidding for action in near by Washington
D.C.68
From Fall 1861 to spring of 1862, King’s Brigade and the Sixth Wisconsin spent its time on
picket duty in the vicinity of Washington D.C. and Baltimore, Maryland. Their only action was running
into secession supporters in Baltimore and being plugged with rocks, bricks and a few bullets while on
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guard duty.69 Captain Dawes wisely took this time to bond with his troop and partook in song-singing
with his friend Captain Edward Brown and even “…tossing men in a blanket,” a game where his men
“…became expert…” at. Captain Dawes himself tried once and recalled “having no desire to repeat the
experience” afterward.70 Levity would fill Dawes’ personality and fortunately for his men, so did
kindness. The captain would frequently carry the knapsacks of his exhausted men as they marched around
Northern Virginia as well as attending church services with them, though the captain was moderately
religious at best.71 Captain Dawes’ kind nature smiled upon him on July 1, 1862 when he became Major
Rufus Dawes. His rival and friend Frank Haskell, tallied thirteen officer votes while Dawes edged him
with fourteen. Major Dawes asserted that he owed his appointment to major of the Sixth Wisconsin to his
friend Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Bragg, who Dawes recollected always worked hard in support for him
as well as Captain Edward Brown who displayed a constant supportive nature for his friend Major
Dawes.72
Major Rufus Dawes and Captain James Cooper Nisbet evolved quickly and seamlessly settled
into their rolls as leaders in their junior officer ranks. Each man effectively made sure that he gained the
trust of his men as well as earning their respect. The aspect of trust and respect could be observed as
underrated by many Civil War officers, general staff included. As Dawes and Nisbet neared the inevitable
storm of combat, the chaos that overlaps clarity in battle will call for assurance and courage to be
displayed by its regiments officers. Over the previous year, Major Dawes and Captain Nisbet vehemently
studied their men to understand their capabilities. “I don’t believe there can be better soldiers” Rufus
Dawes wrote to his brother Ephram upon reflection before their first battle.73 James Nisbet in similar
observation recorded “…prompted by pride, zeal and a sense of duty” his men “…were born fighters.”74
Each man projected strong words about their units and fortunately for Major Dawes and Captain Nisbet,
they were correct in their opinions. However, 1862 would be a challenging and exhausting year for both
Union and Confederate armies.
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Chapter 4: The Shenandoah Valley Campaign

The protracted winter of 1861 into 1862 proved to be a time of reorganization for each of the
inexperienced armies. To the masses of men that seemingly roamed aimlessly in the vicinity of
Washington D.C., the first Battle of Manassas seemed ages ago. As both the Union and Confederate
Armies began to reorganize their forces, Captain James Cooper Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia
Infantry found themselves attached to a new unit. The Georgians were added to General Richard S.
Ewell’s division, and into the Seventh Brigade commanded by General Issac R. Trimble.75 Having yet to
see combat, the Twenty-First Georgia Infantry settled into winter quarters around Centerville, Virginia in
October of 1861.76
Captain Nisbet spent his time in the freezing winter camp breaking up fights over liquor and
attempting to navigate the haphazard Confederate commissary department. The winter of 1861 into 1862
was particularly harsh; in an effort to retrieve clothing for his frozen men, Captain Nisbet ended up under
arrest for being absent without leave. Even though his colonel instructed him to carry out the deed.77 Thus
was the chronic state of the Confederate Army’s command structure which plagued units with their
incompetence for the duration of the war. The incident probably did not bother Captain Nisbet much. At
least his men would now know that he cared about their wellbeing. Howbeit the monotony of camp life
would be soon disturbed by a small skirmish while loading railcars, a skirmish that became the TwentyFirst Georgia’s first encounter with the enemy and Captain Nisbet’s first brush with executing commands.
Selected as work detail to load a railcar of provisions for the Confederate Army’s advance
towards the Yorktown Peninsula, Captain Nisbet and Company H became the target of Federal Napoleon
guns from across the Rappahannock River. “Shells were bursting around us” recalled Nisbet.78As a
company commander, Captain Nisbet was now to instruct his troops for the first time. Nisbet’s combat
routine became manifested at this moment. The options that coerced action were made evident
immediately. Confederate calvary, which served as his advanced pickets, began to flee at his front. The
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Confederate horsemen were pursued back across the river by the Federal Irish Brigade. Despite the
defining ordnance deluging about the rail-hub, Nisbet harkened a piercing engine whistle which jarred
him out of his lethargic state. He bounded for the engine and ordered an immediate halt until all of the
provisions were loaded properly.79 Still the Federal artillery fire and pressing infantry charge seemed to be
overwhelming the small company. Nisbet returned to his command and steadied his men. They braced for
the inevitable clash with the pressing Federals who now attempted to ford the river as well as dash across
a rail bridge to their immediate front. General J.E.B. Stuart’s Confederate calvary rallied in time to stymie
the charge. The troopers broke for the rail bridge and began setting the structure ablaze, halting the
Federal crossing. Captain Nisbet brought up the rest of his company to support the disarranged horsemen
but the men he ordered forward were lacking proper equipment. However, Nisbet regrets that “in the
excitement I did not take much notice of the recruits, who were standing there under the shelling,
unarmed.”80 The men were determined to get into a fight, but the excitement of the moment clouded their
minds. Captain Nisbet’s baptism of fire held every characteristic of combat chaos, albeit on a small scale.
Nevertheless, a clear understanding of the situation regardless the size of the spectacle is imperative for
success in combat. Fortunately for Captain James Nisbet and Company H the situation at the depot did
not develop into a major engagement.
The Federals withdrew before the skirmish developed into a full-scale engagement. Fortuitously,
Nisbet averted a disaster as the result of the Federal withdrawal. In view of this, Captain Nisbet’s
understanding of battle reveled itself as an ever-changing procedure. In his military career as combat
increased in ferocity, Nisbet smartly applied a constant evaluation of his guidelines as incomprehensible
situations and chaos forced itself upon he and the Twenty-First Georgia. Observation of the battlefield
then deployment of commands rather than deployment of the unit then observing while already engaged
with the enemy, was the idea that saved lives and won the day.
As the winter of early 1862 dissipated, one of the first full-scale military campaigns in the eastern
theater of war came to fruition quite rapidly. In early March, General Thomas J. Jackson sought to relieve
the pressure of a mass buildup of Federal forces upon Virginia’s Yorktown peninsula under Union General
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George B. McClellan. Orders from the Confederate capital in Richmond, Virginia flowed into the General
Jackson’s headquarters. The Shenandoah Valley was to be under his watch as was the incorporation of an
immediate diversion of troops from the Peninsula. The protection of its natural food resources would be
imperative for the sustaining of a functional army let alone the entire war-effort. The Valley served an
alternate importance as well. The use of its high mountain outcroppings could screen an attack from the
watchful eyes of Washington D.C. The Federal high-command observed this threat, and President
Abraham Lincoln called for a force thirty-thousand strong under General Nathaniel Banks to descend into
the Valley to relieve this notion of surprise. However, the speed and execution of Jackson’s small force of
five-thousand troops would wreak havoc upon The Federals under General Banks as the protection of the
“breadbasket” of the Confederacy would now be under General “Stonewall” Jackson’s bizarre and distant
gaze.81
On March 23, The Battle of Kernstown resulted in General Jackson’s first and only defeat in the
Shenandoah Valley. Kernstown informed Jackson that he would be viscously outnumbered in the Valley
and that he would have to adapt to the far numerically superior Federal forces pursing his every move. A
cat and mouse game ensued, as it evidently became Jackson’s only option. A month later, after falling
back through the Valley, Jackson’s command would swell to almost twenty-thousand troops, thanks to
General Richard Ewell’s presence. On April 30, The Battle of McDowell resulted in the route of General
John C. Frémont’s Federal forces at the peak of the Allegheny Mountains, northwest of the Shenandoah
Valley. Jackson could now turn north up the Valley and reclaim the previously lost ground capitulated one
month earlier.82
On May 23, Captain James Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia stood beside a dusty road at
“present arms.”83 The Georgians watched as General Richard Taylor’s Louisiana brigade dashed into
formation at a crossroads before the small town of Front Royal. Flawlessly executing its deployment,
Taylor’s brigade immediately advanced at the double quick and captured the Federals, the town and to
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Nisbet’s astonishment even before Trimble’s Brigade could form into lines of battle.84 The Battle of Front
Royal would have been Nisbet’s first intensive combat experience if it were not for the experienced and
decisive Louisianan’s near-flawless combat savviness. Once again Captain James Nisbet became an
observer to a crack combat unit. Using his keen observation skills, Nisbet began to understand that it was
imperative that speed took initiative in battle. Catching units in retreat was to pay in favorable dividends
to an undersized force in pursuit. Captain James Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia would get their
chance to execute such exactitude in combat in twenty-four hours.
At dawn on May 25, General Richard Ewell’s division deployed on the Federal left around the
outskirts of Winchester, Virginia. General Issac Trimble and his Two Twenty-Ones advanced along the
Millwood Turnpike. Steadying his line, Captain Nisbet called for strict alignment as he rode ahead of his
company. Nisbet kept an eye on the Twenty-First North Carolina advancing about fifty yards ahead of the
Twenty-First Georgia to their right but just as the North Carolinians disappeared into a cedar thicket, “a
battery on a hill in town opened upon us” Nisbet remembered.85 Simultaneously a Federal volley opened
to the right of the Twenty-First Georgia and penetrated the Twenty-First North Carolina as they exited the
woods. The Twenty-First North Carolina was stunned and their advanced stalled and threatened to sever
their connection with the Georgians. Command broke down as nearly all of the North Carolinian officers
were causalities as a result of the previous volley from the concealed Fifth Connecticut.86 Glancing over
to his regiment just as the Connecticut Federals fired another volley into the Carolinians, Colonel Mercer
of the Twenty-First Georgia ordered his company commanders to double quick to their immediate right to
retain a connection with the Carolinians as well as assist their stunned comrades. In an iterative measure,
especially to his company, Nisbet steadied his line just as orders to fire an enfilade volley into the flank of
the Fifth Connecticut were given. Company H directed a volley into the Federals, which in turn drew
some of the fire away from the Carolinians. Nisbet remembered the dense smoke from the rifles of either
side as it coagulated above the battlefield. He then recalled that the Twenty-First Georgia “…received a
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volley from another regiment behind a fence at right angles to the first…”87 But the torrent of bullets was
aimed high over the heads of the Georgians. The strategy of unrelenting movement towards the enemy
position threatened an overlapping of the disorganized Federal flank. The Two Twenty-Ones recuperated
and concentrated together as they pushed to within yards of the stunned Federals. “We kept going to the
right, until we got into the rear of the enemy” minds Nisbet. 88 The idea of constant movement without
laps, perviously observed as Taylor’s Louisianan's pushed into Front Royal a day before, undoubtedly
resonated in the minds of Nisbet and the other Captains of the Twenty-First Georgia. The Federals began
to fall back through the streets of Winchester, as Nisbet and the victorious Georgians congratulated
themselves on their first combat victory.
At the Battle of Winchester, Captain Nisbet was under a regimental command rather than
independent command as he and Company H were at the rail depot. Yet he still applied observation to
steady his troop as they advanced and eventually overwhelmed the Federal position. Control and
placement of his company was maintained in relatively good order. Much in thanks to the Battle of
Winchester being an utter Federal route, Captain Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia would not be
susceptible to constant and concentrated rifle and artillery fire. Thusly the Two Twenty-Ones freely
maneuvered as they pleased in the face of the enemy. Captain Nisbet executed his orders precisely and
gained more combat experience.
Furious at the embarrassment suffered at Winchester, General John C. Frémont pressured the
Confederates under Jackson into a steady retreat. Unbeknownst to Frémont, the retreat was necessary for
Jackson’s command in order to choose the ground on which he wanted to fight upon, and also fight each
pursuing Federal force separately. As Jackson concentrated his forces around the vicinity of a small
settlement called Cross Keys, Union General James Shields moved to Jackson’s front and gave battle.89
At 9:00 am on June 8, General Issac Trimble’s brigade took position atop a small rise to the front
of a clover field.90 Twenty-First Georgia scrambled up to a rail fence and dropped to the ground. Nisbet
and the company commanders gave the order to load and prepare for the impending attack. The junior
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officers observed the pending battle. To the Twenty-First Georgia’s immediate front, a mass of Union blue
materialized rapidly. The woodlot behind the regiment along with the fence concealed their position. The
long line of blue advanced in perfect order, methodically. Nisbet and the other captains noticed the
Federal’s neglected to deploy skirmishers. As a result of this rather lazy and dangerous approach, the
Federals would stumble into the Confederate firing line without any warning. 91 The line of blue began to
close in as the Georgians took aim at the targets.92 As the Federals crested the rise to Nisbet’s front, the
banners of the Eight New York Infantry became legible. The New Yorkers approached to within fifty
yards to the Georgian’s front. At forty yards, the officers of the Twenty-First Georgia belted the
anticipated order to fire. “Sudden as lightning the whole fence seemed converted into a volcano more
terrible than Vasuvious (sic)” as one of Nisbet’s colleagues Captain Ujanirtus Allen recalled. Captain
Nisbet and Captain Allen steadied their companies as they rammed home their second round of buck-andball cartages. The close range of these shotgun-like blasts decimated the New Yorkers, who lost nearly
three-hundred men instantaneously. 93 “The Blue-coats halted, and tried to return fire” Nisbet recalled.
“We gave them two more rounds then charged over the fence.” 94 Captain Nisbet and the other officers
saw the opportunity to bag an entire Federal regiment. The Georgians, using the tactic of unrelenting
advancement, plunged into the confused Federals. Captain Allen recalled in a letter to his wife that “our
boys mount the fence like deer and follow down the hill shooting stragglers…”95 As the Georgians swept
down the hill, their impetuous pace propels them into the Sixteenth Mississippi to their right. Nisbet and
the energized Georgians “…charged right over them…” and into the fleeing New Yorkers.96 The Federal
command was shattered and the pressing Confederate counterattack negated an attempt for a rally.
Captain James Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia routed their first opponent.
Nisbet was now a veteran soldier. “Stonewall” Jackson’s valley campaign conditioned the
Twenty-First Georgia into assuming combat situations would result in their favor. At the Battle of Cross
Keys, Captain Nisbet exercised his command to the best of his ability, for he was once again under
91
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command of the regimental staff. Observation and control of his men, raced through his mind as he kept
his company jointly in accordance with commands. An ideal defensive position atop a rise, behind a fence
and at the front of a wooded area resulted in surprise for the Federals. Pursuing a much larger force after a
stunning volley once again presented the Georgians with the best opportunity for success. Nisbet
undoubtedly noticed that utilizing the landscape of a battlefield can shift momentum and also present a
significant issue for the enemy. As Nisbet’s command and responsibility increases, his understanding of a
battle’s landscape will be the deciding factor in victory or complete decimation of his unit. In the
meantime, the Army of the Potomac was knocking upon the gates of Richmond.
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Chapter 5: The Battle of Gaines’ Mill
As Captain James Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia were cutting their teeth in combat with
“Stonewall” Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, Captain Rufus Dawes and the Sixth Wisconsin stood idol.
The Midwesterners lounged around the picturesque Virginia town of Fredericksburg, as the war
seemingly passed them by. Though on May 10, a ruckus jolted through camp as rumors swirled that there
was to be a fight soon enough. However, Captain Dawes recalled “…there were not enough rebels in the
vicinity to accommodate our men with the desired fight.”97 The Sixth Wisconsin returned to a state of
intense boredom. On May 17, the regiment’s hopefulness was boosted when a shipment of “…white
leggings, black felt hats adorned with feathers and white cotton gloves” arrived at camp headquarters.98
Spirits lifted greatly as the Midwesterners paraded around camp in their regular army uniforms. A sense
of pride and identity now covered the forlorn thoughts of missing out on the war. Now donned in
regular’s uniforms, much was to be expected from Dawes and the Sixth Wisconsin. The unit would
undoubtedly get their chance to fight, but not before Captain Rufus Dawes is subjected to a surprise of his
own. On July 1, Dawes is promoted to Major.99 Now his responsibilities grew to one half of the regiment,
even before their first battle together. However, he and his men would still have to wait another month
before they were given the chance to offer their services to the defense of their country. Until then, they
sat impatiently, as winter thawed.
The officers of the Twenty-First Georgia stared at their colonel as he laid motionless in a pine
thicket. Federal artillery shells rained down on the Georgians at a constant pace, but Colonel Mercer was
not dead, but drunk. Lt. Colonel Thomas Hooper, Captain James Nisbet and others tried rousting the man
back to consciousness, but to no avail. 100 Upon seeing no other option, Lt. Colonel Hooper took over the
command of the Twenty-First Georgia. The Federal shells seemed to increase their range and now the
ordinance directly targeted the troubled regiment. Nisbet saw to his company and just in time to see
Taylor’s Lousianians’ leap into a steep ravine not two-hundred yards to their front and left. The Georgians
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always observed Taylor’s aggressive Cajon’s pitching forward, so that evening would be nothing different
for the brigade. The officers of the Twenty-First Georgia looked ahead to study what was to their front.
An abandon shack stood next to an unkempt dirt field. For a quarter mile beyond that, the field ran into a
rapid decline towards a swampy marsh and an ankle deep stream, that provided a natural obstacle for an
advance. The trees beyond that stream looked to be felled intentionally to create fields of fire for three
long and fortified blue lines that ascend a hillside up to a white farmhouse. To each side of the house,
countless batteries of Federal guns added their reinforcement to the entrenched Federal infantry.
It was 4:00 pm on June 27, 1862 and the Battle of Gaines’ Mill had been raging for nearly three
hours.101 General A.P. Hill’s normally stout division was stymied by the fierce Federal fire seemingly
coming from every angle upon that hill. To relieve General Hill’s exhausted command, General Richard
Ewell brought his division forward, immediately sending General Richard Taylor’s Lousianians into the
fray.102 Captain James Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia watched their Cajon mentors return shattered
in spirt and visibly distraught. The Lousianians broke after their beloved Major Roberdeau Wheat was
killed instantly as he foolishly stepped out in front of his command. Colonel Issac Seymour attempted to
rally the beleaguered brigade but was struck down as well.103 Stunned at the sight of the fleeing
Lousianians, Nisbet took note that this day would be won only on the junior officer’s accord. Foolishness
would only get someone killed.
“Just then we were ordered in” recalled Nisbet. “We met the Louisiana Brigade coming out in
good order. One said ‘Boys you are mighty good but that’s Hell in there.” 104 Undaunted and disregarding
the comment as an overreaction, Nisbet and his company pressed forward. The Georgians began to fall
from the Federal rifle fire. As the regiment descended the slope and into to the muddy creek, Nisbet
rallied his company on the opposite bank. He quickly counted heads and noted “Lt. Easley and six…had
been killed, and about ten…wounded.”105 Nisbet calmed his men and helped them pick targets amongst
the Federal breastworks. It was all he could do until field commands were ordered.
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Federal ordinance along with his men was falling all around at an alarming rate.106 Nisbet knew it
was important to retain composure in order to effectively command his company. Lt. Colonel Hooper
found Captain Nisbet and informed him that “Captain Waddail waves his seniority…” to Nisbet’s favor.107
Nisbet looked at the man and realized Hooper was severely wounded in his arm. Just as soon as Hooper
had passed command over, he was gone. Captain James Cooper Nisbet, twenty-three years old, found
himself in command of a regiment, pinned down and in what some claim to be the worst firefight of the
war.
Nisbet observed the situation. He needed to pull the regiment back in order to formulate some
sort of plan. His regiment was in danger of being completely routed. Nisbet remembered that he
“… hastened down the line ordering the officers to draw their companies back…”108 His idea was that
controlled order gave the regiment the best chance to survive the day and capture the objective.
The regiment withdrew back over the ravine and behind a knoll to its immediate rear. Nisbet now placed
the regiment in a more covered position behind the creek. However, the Georgians were still pinned down
by an incredible Federal fire. The regiment could not keep at their rally point much longer, so Nisbet
called his company commanders over and explained the situation. They would press the attack rather than
withdraw from the field. On his orders, the regiment would advance rapidly over to the opposite side of
the creek, to the position they previously held. However, this time the Georgians were to deliver
suppressing fire in the prone position, an idea Nisbet conjured upon having observed that the Georgian’s
fire was more effective from the creek’s bank, given the concealment offered by the creek bank.109 Nisbet
led the advance and his Georgians followed close behind.
As the Twenty-First Georgia engaged the stubborn Federals from their position on the banks of
Boatswain Creek, Captain Nisbet “… noticed that the enemy was retreating up the hill towards their
battery.”110 The whole Confederate line began to advance after the Federals who were pulling back to the
crest of their defenses. Nisbet ordered his companies forward and to keep a close correspondence with the
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fleeing Federals. Nisbet kept the regiment pressing on towards the hill’s crest, darting ahead and exposing
himself carelessly to Federal fire. The regiment began to stride closer to the Federal batteries, but Nisbet’s
recklessness had consequences. “A shell bursting just as it passed me, the concussion blew me up in the
air six or eight feet” he remembered. 111 Two men trailing Nisbet dissolved into thin air following the
blast. Captain Nisbet was incredibly lucky to have survived leading in front of his command in the face of
such devastating fire. After gathering what was left of themselves, Captain James Nisbet and the TwentyFirst Georgia collapsed beside the Watt House that evening, carrying the day but at an enormous coast.
That night, Captain Nisbet accompanied a few soldiers in a search for their missing brother. They
soon came across the poor boy who was nursing a mortal head wound. The group comforted the boy and
reassured him that they did in fact capture the Federal position. His spirits lightened but soon after he
died, fortunately along side his brothers. Captain Nisbet knew that in accompanying his men in times like
these meant the world to them. Unfortunately for Nisbet, treks in search of dead or wounded friends
became far too frequent. In his memoirs, he mourns upon this story: “Many such pathetic incidents came
under my observation. In the battles herein described. I don’t like to dwell on them.”112 Though as painful
as it must have been for Nisbet, he still assisted his men, because he cared for them, and needed them.
The Twenty-First Georgia intended to mend after Gaines’ Mill, but the pursuit of General George
McClellan’s Union Army did not relent. A month before the Seven Days Battles, the Confederate Army
found itself under a new commander. General Robert E. Lee assumed command of the troubled defense of
Richmond following the wounding of General Joesph E. Johnston. For a month General Lee strengthened
his defensive lines that surrounded the Confederate capital. McClellan’s inability to organize an advance
on his thin lines befuddled Lee. Therefrom rather than ordering a collective defense of the Confederate
capital as he originally planned, General Lee opted for an atypical advance upon the Union positions
surrounding Richmond.113 An odd strategy for the then cautiously labeled general. At this time of the
hostilities, Lee was not the wily grey fox that we know him as today. His tact for alluding and
outmaneuvering the Federal armies was not yet his forte. Throughout the Confederate papers, Lee was
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known as the King of Spades or Granny Lee as he preferred defensive positioning rather than the often
unpredictable and offensively aggressive strategy the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia would be
infamous for. But now George McClellan and the swollen Chickahominy River offered Lee an
opportunity to throw the Federals off the gates of Richmond.114
The day before Gaines’ Mill, the Battle of Beaver Dam Creek undoubtedly added to Lee’s belief
in the success of an offensive strategy. As Confederate forces under General A.P Hill poured into the face
of Federal forces heavily fortified in swampy and unforgiving terrain on the outskirts of Mechanicsville,
Virginia, a bloodbath ensued. If not for General George McClellan’s irrational inability to command a
battle, Robert E. Lee might have exhausted his forces in a constant frontal assault for days. However,
McClellan withdrew to a more favorable defensive position behind Boatswain Creek the next day and in
wake of the withdraw of the Federals, the Battle of Beaver Dam Creek resulted in 361 Federal casualties
to the Confederate 1484; a costly Confederate loss.115 At Gaines’ Mill the following day, Union casualties
totaled 6,837 to the Confederate’s 7,993.116 Lee devastated his army in his relentless frontal assaults, but
also inflicted massive losses upon the Federals. However, for the Federals, they could morbidly afford
casualties at an increased rate. Their ability to recruit and sustain massive armies trumped the Confederate
States effort to recruit for the entirety of the war. Lee’s obedient belief in the invincibility of his command
would result in unnecessary and irreplaceable casualties throughout the war. His insistence on rapid and
unrelenting advancement of his forces in the face of devastating fire is evident in Captain James Nisbet’s
account of Gaines’ Mill. Although that idea contributed towards much success in the early battles of the
Civil War, the rapid deterioration of man power the Confederate Army faced implicated a different type of
strategy for the war effort as the war wained into the dirt and mud of Virginia.
Captain Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia dwelled on their victory after Gaines’ Mill. The
Confederate Army’s unrelenting pursuit of the enemy in the presence of an almost assured defeat, added
to their confidence in combat. Captain James Nisbet coincidently mirrored the tactical ideology of
General Lee at Gaines’ Mill and in doing so coincided with the new found identity of the Confederate
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Army under the budding General Lee. And so The Seven Days Battle ended with a Federal retreat from
the outskirts of Richmond. An all but assured victory for the Union Army slipped away from grasps of the
determined Federal soldiers. As for their unrelenting foe, the Confederate Army found their commander in
General Robert E. Lee. The Virginian now set his army’s sights upon the North, where war would finally
be felt by the Union states. However another Federal army blocked the Confederate Army’s advance
northbound, as Major Rufus Dawes and the Sixth Wisconsin prepared for their first test in combat.
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Chapter 6: The Battle of Brawner Farm
The failure of the Peninsula Campaign devastated General George McClellan. So much so that
the general stood idol in an infantile fit of reproach. Finding it impossible to compel the sulking general to
advance his massive army, President Abraham Lincoln called for a new army to be raised. The Army of
Virginia, made up of the remnants of units destroyed by General “Stonewall” Jackson in the Shenandoah
Valley Campaign months before, random units collected from isolated service around central Virginia and
many green soldiers that formed the defensive guard around Washington D.C. The new army would be
led by General John Pope. Pope, a successful commander was poached from the western theater, where he
led the capture of Island No. 10 in the Mississippi River. However with many flaws both tactically and
personality-wise, Pope was doomed from the start. Unfortunately for the pompous Pope, General Robert
E. Lee was a step ahead at almost every move. Lee, ultimately concerned that Pope and McClellan would
concentrate their forces if given the chance; advanced towards Pope’s front on August 9. A battle ensued
as Pope was forced to withdraw. Cedar Mountain, fought at ninety-plus degree temperatures,
foreshadowed the month ahead and especially hot fighting to come.
Following victory at Cedar Mountain, General Robert E. Lee was no longer concerned with the
possibility of General John Pope and General George B. McClellan’s armies linking up in Virginia.
Seizing the initiative to place his army between the Federal capital and Pope’s Army, Lee marched for
Manassas Junction. The rail hub held a massive reserve of Federal Army rations as well as horses and
munitions. Exhausted after marching one hundred miles in three days, Captain James Cooper Nisbet and
the Twenty-First Georgia reached Manassas Junction barely contested, yet exhausted.117 After a light
skirmish, the Two Twenty-Ones captured the junction and feasted upon rations intended for an entire
army. Whatever they could not consume and carry was to be eliminated. “It nearly broke our hearts to
destroy any of the needful food and clothing” Nisbet bemoaned, but “to see our half-starved men, tattered
and barefoot, filling up on canned goods…as they strutted around in new shoes…was a very amusing and
satisfying site.”118 Pope’s Army, completely taken, turned to meet Lee in the vicinity of the old Bull Run
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battlefield. As Pope concentrated his lumbering forces to his immediate rear, Major Rufus Dawes and the
Sixth Wisconsin now marched in the lead of the startled Federal Army.
On the evening of August 27, 1862, Major Rufus Dawes screamed above the sound of
Confederate artillery for his men to “lie down.” Six rebel cannon pounded away at the Iron Brigade as
they meandered towards Centerville, Virginia.119 Dawes knew that “…discreet and respectful obeisance to
a cannon ball is no indication of cowardice.”120 The protection of his men was imperative at that moment.
The Sixth Wisconsin had not yet seen combat yet and to be a causality before the chance to prove oneself
worth on the battlefield seemed a rather dull thought. Fortunately for the Midwesterners, the Confederate
artillery’s aim was poor. The guns sent their shells harmlessly over the heads of the Federal’s taking cover
on the banks of the road. General John Gibbon’s brigade could see the movement of Confederate units to
the right of a heavily wooded lot. Undoubtedly the motion became more clear as the sun set over the hills.
The Confederate forces who were shielded by their artillery finally advanced from their protection behind
the dense wood-line. General Gibbon understood battle was certain and ordered his brigade to load their
rifles.
General Gibbon ordered his only veteran regiment, the Second Wisconsin, forward. Only a year
earlier at the Battle of First Bull Run, those men advance over similar ground only a few miles down the
road. The rest of Gibbon’s Brigade laid in wait. Major Rufus Dawes watched with his men as the Second
Wisconsin marched in a branded perfect order out of sight. General Gibbon stretched in the saddle to see
his lead regiment step off. The woods before the Second Wisconsin were crawling with Confederates. The
veterans of the Second Wisconsin halted and waited for their foe to organize their advance. The ranks of
the Second Wisconsin began shooting insults and curses toward the Confederate ranks. The eagerness of
impending uncertainty was agonizing for the solider. A final “come on God Damn you” was muttered
from someone as the ranks quieted.121 The unmistakable sound of rifle fire filled the air as the rest of
Gibbon’s brigade laid in the road. The general could not see a thing but knew he must send support to the
Second Wisconsin. General Gibbon snapped to the Nineteenth Indiana orders to reenforce the Second
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Wisconsin’s flank. Major Rufus Dawes observed the Indianians as they advanced at the double “…as if to
save a friend in peril.” It was six o’clock pm as the sun began to set. 122
Major Rufus Dawes and the Sixth Wisconsin waited impatiently to be sent into the action. The
major knew the regiment would be off soon enough. Behind the regiment Captain John Campbell’s
Battery B drove towards a fence line to the right. Major Dawes ordered some of his men to tear down the
fence and escort the cherished guns through the opening.123 The Federal artillery opened up on the
Confederate position and Major Dawes took upon the moment to guide his “…sturdy old mare” amongst
the men and offered his best encouragement.124 The anticipation was unbearable but soon an aid to
General Gibbon found the ranks of the Sixth Wisconsin. The frantic man shouted that “the Second was
being slaughtered” and ordered Colonel Lysander Cutler to advance his regiment to their aid.125
Cutler passed on the orders to his junior officers to advance their companies. The nervous but
confident Midwesterners began to advance forward. The Sixth Wisconsin felt the importance of the
impending engagement and paired with the uncertainty of what may happen, plagued the ranks of the
volunteers and leaders alike. Training and drilling was implemented for this reason alone. Replacing the
stress of impending battle and forming it into drill kept the minds of the solider clear and on the idea of
something other than doom. Major Dawes advanced to the front of his ranks but his mount spooked at the
sound of the artillery exploding to their front. Losing control of his steed, the mount steered him over a
rail fence to the regiment’s front. The beast launched itself over all in one leap and safely landed on the
other side with Dawes still remarkably attached to his saddle. The men cheered the unintended action and
loosened the advancing lines up in spirit.126
The Sixth Wisconsin moved swiftly past Campbell’s guns at the double-quick. With the woods to
their left, a hill to their front masked the regiment's movement for the moment. The setting sun silhouetted
the ranks of soldiers. Flashes from the rifles of the Second and Seventh Wisconsin lit up the woods to
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their left.127 Major Dawes steadied his line, the crest of a hill was a few yards away. Upon reaching it the
Sixth Wisconsin finally observed a dry stream bed covered by a thin contour of trees to their front.
Beyond that, a slightly rising field with a decaying rail fence posted defiantly in the center. The
Confederate lines began to advance for the fence line. The Sixth Wisconsin was fortunate enough to have
some cover in that dried stream bed. The advancing Confederates were not so entitled to that fortune.
Colonel Cutler, Lt. Colonel Bragg, and Major Dawes continued to push their line towards the
shelter of the dried creek bed. Upon reaching it, the Confederates did not hesitate a moment and delivered
a volley into the Federal ranks. The volley was high and the rounds smacked into the trees and fence posts
to the Sixth’s front.128 Colonel Lysander Cutler ordered a halt to his advancing regiment. Doing as junior
officers should, Major Dawes repeated the order to his left wing. The Seventh Wisconsin advanced into a
position nearly one hundred yards away from the left of the Sixth Wisconsin. Immediately a rapidly
approaching wave of Confederates surged out of the woods to their immediate front and stifled the
Seventh’s progress. Major Dawes could see that their brothers were dropping in heaps and corrected his
vision to the battle to his front.129 Colonel Cutler ordered the Sixth Wisconsin to fire. Dawes and the
other junior officers repeated his orders at their loudest. The Midwesterners wasted no time and volleyed
into the pursuing Confederate lines. Strangely unperturbed, the Confederate line shuttered but continued
forward with a hight-pitched shriek. Major Dawes ordered his men to lay to prone the ground. Standing
up to the advancing Confederate tide only added to the causality lists.
Alabamians, Carolinians, and Georgians all surged together and forward towards the deteriorating
rail fence to their front. Upon reaching the center of the field, Captain James Nisbet and his company used
what was left of the fence as cover. Two Federal regiments to the Two Twenty-Ones front and left caught
sight of the Confederate charge and obliquely aimed a most devastating volley into the ranks. 130 Nisbet
had been in this situation before, only months before. This time he was not in command and in this

127

From Dawes position, he could not see the Nineteenth Indiana. They were positioned to the extreme left and covered by hilly
terrain.
128 Dawes, Service With the Sixth Wisconsin. 61-62.
129 Ibid.
130 The charge of the Twenty-First North Carolina and Twenty-First Georgia drew the fire from Major Rufus Dawes’ left wing of
the Sixth Wisconsin, along with the entirety of the Fifty-Sixth Pennsylvania and the right wing of the Seventy-Sixth New York.
The crossfire almost decimated both Confederate regiments before a retreat could be ordered.

THE BATTLE OF BRAWNER FARM

41

position only a wooden rail covered his extremities.131 The Twenty-First Georgia was pinned in a
devastating fire. The men were ravaged by a devastating fire from the Federal’s. For Captain Nisbet, there
would be no leading by example that evening.
For forty minutes, the Twelfth Alabama, Fifteenth Alabama, and the Two Twenty-Ones fired into
the Sixth Wisconsin and the Fifty-Sixth Pennsylvania.132 Both sides showed no order but rather
demonstrated a mass of bloodied humanity. Major Dawes called the opposing lines who were engaged
less than fifty yards apart “two crowds.”133 All recognition of Hardee’s tactics, the staple of military
command in that day, became an inconvenience for the struggling battle lines, and quickly became
disregarded on Brawner Farm. Warfare had begun to change as the Civil War progressed. The realization
of the disastrous impact of such outdated tactics became evident as absurd amounts of casualties lined the
battlefields. However, the two forces engaged at Brawner Farm in that moment had become all too
absorbed with one another. Each side refused to be bested by the other, and to each stubborn opposing
forces, the consequences of holding a firing line in the open would prove extremely severe as the battle
concluded at sundown.
The Confederate charge to the center of Brawner’s field, in retrospect, was nothing but foolish.
The brigade commander, General Issac Trimble, accustomed to quick advances in battle, pushed his Two
Twenty-Ones too far forward. As a result, both were annihilated by the Sixth Wisconsin and the FiftySixth Pennsylvania.134 Except that for Trimble’s brigade, it was customary for their foe to turn-tail and
evacuate the field after an aggressive advance. Besides the Battle of Gaines’ Mill, Trimble’s Brigade had
not been challenged as severely as they were at Brawner Farm. The impact of the professionalism of the
Sixth Wisconsin’s ability in battle, served Trimble’s men their first loss, and a costly one at that. The war
was changing, and the Federal’s ability to execute in battle was as well.
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Captain James Nisbet recalled almost nothing of the Battle of Brawner Farm. This is rather
strange solely because he actively recorded the events of every action he partook in, even down to the
small skirmishes. Nisbet only managed to record a single sentence recounting the battle: “Braver men
never went into battle.”135 One could surmise that the shame of his regiment losing 315 of its 350
effectives caused that irregular laps in memory.136 Or it could be that he just did not want to “dwell” on
the slaughter of his beloved regiment. Nevertheless, he indeed was there, and he did lead his company
that evening.
Major Rufus Dawes, strode his horse back and forth as darkness fell. The overzealous beast
hopping and dodging the rodent holes on its own accord.137 Dawes searched for the next move. He
understood now, after the recent experience of intense Confederate rifle fire, that to stand idol was foolish
and costly. Looking to his right towards the regimental colors, Colonel Cutler sat atop his horse, unfazed
at the intense fire. Major Dawes approached his seemingly annoyed Colonel and without
acknowledgement of his major, Cutler called out to Major Dawes “our men are giving ground on the left,
Major.”138 Major Dawes shook off the unsure jab by the old colonel. But before Dawes could request
orders, Cutler “gave a convulsive start and clapped his hand on his leg.”139 Simultaneously, Cutler’s
mount was hit by a ball. Knowing the consequence of the well-aimed Confederate fire, Major Dawes
immediately galloped to Lt. Colonel Bragg to inform him he had command of the regiment. The small but
aggressive Bragg immediately ordered an advance. The Federal group began to shuffle forward and Major
Dawes, in the midst of his men once again, pushed his mount ahead, all the while shouting all the
encouragement he could muster.140
The Sixth Wisconsin and the Fifty-Sixth Pennsylvania advanced frightfully too close to the
intermingled Confederate regiments. Captain Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia opened up on the left
flank of the Sixth Wisconsin as well as to the front for the Fifty-Sixth Pennsylvania. The fire from the
confused Confederate units was however slackening. Proving too much for the depleted Twenty-first
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Georgia, the regiment’s commander, Major Glover had enough. The order to withdraw was given, but
only after a parting volley from the Federal’s seemingly passed clean-through the ranks of the fledgling
Confederates.141 The Twenty-First Georgia had finally left a battlefield in defeat.
A retreating Confederate volley staggered the advancing Federals. Though they steadied
themselves against the final fire, Lt. Colonel Bragg ordered a withdraw, but on the regiment’s terms and
in what became a patented step-by-step maneuver of the brigade.142 The flashes of rifle fire gave way to
the uncomfortable sounds of the wounded and dying. The Sixth Wisconsin had finally participated in its
first battle. In an odd case, it may be said that they were fortunate to experienced such a fierce fight. All
other conflicts might seem more manageable to the veterans of the Gibbon’s Brigade henceforth. The
Sixth Wisconsin withdrew from the hotly contested field of battle, methodically. Major Rufus Dawes
sorted through his command and rallied together all he could find of his command. At 9 o’clock the battle
had mercifully concluded. Three cheers were ordered by Lt. Colonel Bragg. The shouts echoed through
the woodlot between the cries of the wounded and dying, only to be acknowledged with no rebuttal by the
Confederates.143
Through often forgotten, the Battle of Brawner Farm proved to be a ferocious engagement.
Unfortunately, the action would be outdone in the next few days, as General John Pope’s Army of
Virginia was utterly routed and slaughtered a few miles down the road. For Major Rufus Dawes and the
Sixth Wisconsin, the engagement proved to be humbling. The Midwesterners lived up to the status of
their U.S. Regulars’ uniform and handled themselves to perfection in the face of nearly insurmountable
odds. Major Dawes exercised his command to the best of his ability, steading and supporting his wing of
the regiment cooly and competently. Dawes was in the thick of the fighting and shared the same dangers
that his companies faced. The two men Dawes looked up to the most, Colonel Cutler and Lt. Colonel
Bragg, handled themselves wonderfully. Exercising good decision making as well as keeping a constant
report with their officers. Dawes observed both men constantly during the fight, mimicking their
movements as well as psychically partaking in the desperate fight. As the Sixth Wisconsin marched away
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from the battlefield, Major Dawes could not help but feel for his exhausted and wounded men. Seeing one
of his captains fall to the ground on the march towards Pope’s lines, Dawes leapt from his mount and
assisted the man into the saddle. He continued to give his horse up to the wounded until the reached
Pope’s converging army.144
The Sixth’s Manassas nightmare was not over. The following three days, the unit was plagued by
Confederate sharpshooters, as well as a near constant artillery barrage. To add to their collective
discomfort, General Fitz John Porter’s V Corps, en route their own rude awakening, taunted Gibbon’s
exhausted brigade. “We are going to show you straw-feet how to fight” they shouted as they shuffled
by.145 Unknown to them, the unit, Duryea’s Zouaves, were routed in only minutes within the following
hour. As a solider in the Sixth Wisconsin teased, the “slack in their baggy pantaloons” were let out.146 The
Sixth Wisconsin found themselves a rear-guard once again, as General James Longstreet’s massive and
crushing counter attack rolled up the Union left flank. As the gray wave rolled into the Union flank the
exhausted Midwesterners ran for cover. “I shouted to my men to ‘tree’,” Dawes recalled. “I jumped
behind a small tree myself, where I must have shrunk to the dimension of a wafer.” 147 Major Dawes
exercised the idea of living to fight another day. The Sixth would survive the onslaught, but only to be
deployed in a few weeks into some of the most intense fighting of the war.
Captain James Nisbet’s regiment was ruined. The Twenty-First Georgia was accustomed to
victory, but The Valley, The Seven Days, Manassas Junction all now seemed a distant memory to the
demoralized ranks of Georgians. The 242 men that filled the ranks of the Twenty-First Georgia, were now
whittled down to 69 effectives.148 Unfortunately Nisbet’s ideas of the battle were left unrecorded, but a
good soldier, which he certainly was, learned from a disastrous outcome. Cover was the key to battle and
the former experience suggests that it was necessary for victory. Advancing into the face of an opponent
was a bygone tactic. Critically thinking of the repercussions of an advance served in a command’s best
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interest. The Federals had fight in them now, their demeanor in battle was different and they were not to
be pushed around.
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Chapter 7: The Battle of South Mountain
Slowly, the Army of the Potomac under General George McClellen moved from Eastern Virginia
into Maryland. Lee, his army thriving off of his recent victory, crossed into Maryland as well, siting the
vast and fruitful farmlands to feed his exhausted but victorious army. The idea that the citizens of
Maryland assisting in the Confederate war effort, entertained the ragged army. However, this was not the
case for the Confederates. Many citizens took to ignoring the distasteful looking Rebels. Others jeered
them as the disgustingly ragged army entered Frederick, Maryland on September 10. Disregarding the
hostile atmosphere, Lee set out to capture the Federal garrisons at Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry.149
Expecting these strongholds to withdraw, Lee would march in and sack its contents for his struggling
army. This would not happen as planned. General Henry Halleck ordered the garrisons to hold out to a
man. Lee split his army in order to execute his plans. A tactic that can elude to a military disaster and
inevitably led towards a botched campaign from the start.150 As General “Stonewall” Jackson encircled
Harpers Ferry and trained his artillery on the small Federal force within, the Army of the Potomac caught
General Robert E. Lee with his army scattered about Western Maryland. The Federal Army obliged to the
fact that Lee’s ultimate plan was carelessly lost by an aid and discovered lying under a tree by Federal
soldiers, outside Fredrick, Maryland. On September 15, 1862, Major Rufus Dawes and the Sixth
Wisconsin found General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army in position above Turner’s Gap, Maryland.
The Sixth Wisconsin laid in line of battle before a sloping hill overlooking South Mountain. The
smoke from the developing battle before them obscured the vision of the soldiers. It had been nearly and
hour since Gibbon’s Brigade had been called to the front.151 The anticipation and the feeling of the
uncertainty began its familiar grab at regiment as the Federal artillery blasted away at the mountain-side.
Major Rufus Dawes found himself second in-command of the Sixth Wisconsin. Colonel Lysander Cutler,
still nursing his Brawner Farm wound, remained out of commission. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Bragg
replaced Cutler as the regimental commander for the impending battle. Major Dawes did not mind the
change in command. He was proud of his good friend getting the chance to lead the regiment into combat.
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The good regiment deserved an aggressive commander, and the small and short-fused Bragg was certainly
a pushy one. The sun was setting behind the mountain, but the battle still raged ahead. 152 Orders finally
reached Colonel Bragg to advance. The regiment realized it was to be a familiar twilight fight. However,
this time the entire Union Army would be viewing them ascend the slope into battle.153
For the past half hour, the Seventh Wisconsin and the Nineteenth Indiana had been battling along
the Confederates positioned behind a stonewall on the gap’s mountain side. The heavy woods sabotaged
the regiments rapid advance, and in turn, the Sixth Wisconsin had been forced into an unconventional line
of battle. As Dawes explained, the regiment moved “Indian style” towards the wall.154 Major Dawes, in
command of the right wing of the Sixth Wisconsin, rolled his command up along to the flank of the
Seventh Wisconsin, drawing cheers from their warn Midwestern brethren. 155 The fire from the concealed
Confederate position ravaged the foliage around the regiment. Lt. Colonel Bragg ordered Major Dawes to
draw the Confederate fire away from the Seventh Wisconsin. The major issued the orders of “attention,
right wing, ready, right oblique, aim, fire, load at will, load.” 156 Major Dawes kept along side his firing
line as the Confederate fire shifted to their front. However, the regiment became stalemated in their
position, and Lt. Colonel Bragg met Major Dawes decided to meet in conference at the the regimental
colors. A plan was devised. Dawes’ right wing was to remain where it was. Bragg would shuffle his left
wing behind Major Dawes’ right wing and then leap-frog each other after every volley.157 The chemistry
between the two commanders worked into a wondrous reaction. The Sixth Wisconsin rapidly executed the
orders until reaching within forty yards of the Confederate position at the stonewall, but the advance
stalled once more, and Bragg and Dawes decided to consult each other about the situation. The two young
officers decided that Bragg’s left would use Dawes’ right as a screen in order to develop the flank of the
Confederate position. The impending dusk would mask their maneuvers as well. The order again was
executed exactly as discussed. Bragg gained his position upon the Confederate flank and Dawes
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analogously exacted his part. The Sixth Wisconsin poured a withering fire into the Confederate flank.158
The fire being so great from the Sixth Wisconsin, Major Dawes noticed the rifles fouling. Unfortunately,
ammunition began to dwindle in the ranks and only added in problems. Major Dawes gave the order to
pick the dead and wounded of cartridges.159 But this did not prove to be sufficient enough to sustain a
continuous fire. Dawes sent an orderly down the slope to request more rounds, but the man returned
empty handed. General Gibbon could do nothing but order his exhausted brigade to hold their position
with the bayonet.160
That night, the Sixth Wisconsin rested on their fouled rifles. The brigade refused to relinquish
their hard fought ground. In their second battle, Gibbon’s Brigade fought as veterans. The ability to
concentrate their fire, execute orders in the heat of combat, and withstand enemy volleys were
characteristics that were difficult to teach, train and develop, let alone execute as an inexperienced
volunteer unit. This can be attributed to the skill of their junior officers’ direction in combat. At Turner’s
Gap, Lt. Colonel Bragg and Major Dawes discovered a shared bond between each other. Not only were
they friends aa well as respectful subordinates, the ability to respect each other in combat only benefited
the entire unit all together. In an army full of ego and skepticism between its officers, these rare junior
officers were able to confide in each other that each would do their duty no matter the circumstances. The
greater good of the regiment would be the command’s prerogative. To lose their incredible veterans
needlessly was not an option. The ninety-two casualties accumulated on the mountain side certainly
would sting the regiment, but we can note if it were not for its attentive junior officers, the casualty rate
could have been extraordinary high that day.161
Major Rufus Dawes and the Sixth Wisconsin marched down the slopes of South Mountain the
next day. They marched to a clearing and finally had their muted longed-for coffee. Regiments passed the
veterans and cheered them. Too exausted, many ignored acclaim but sat and drank their coffee, but with a
new felt pride.162 Within the next hour, the Federal Army was on the march again. The First Brigade, 1st
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Division, I Corps led by General “Fighting Joe” Hooker crawled along the dusty road. The night before,
General Hooker in a meeting with General McClellan, was astonished after hearing him remark that his
Midwesterners fought like an “Iron Brigade.” “Fighting Joe,” accustom to nicknames and the glory
bestowed by them, snatched the name for the pride of his I Corps. 163
After a week of constant marching, Gibbon’s “Iron Brigade” took up a position before a rich
farmstead. The men began to kindle their coffee fires, but those were soon stomped out by overlyaggressive sergeants. Rain began to fall, but many of the unit did not even care nor notice. Federal
pickets attempted to disrupt as much of the contested army’s sleep as they could. The heavy feeling of a
great battle crept over the Maryland countryside once again.
Two days before, Captain James Cooper Nisbet had spent his time around Harpers Ferry, Virginia
watching General “Stonewall” Jackson’s artillery shell the tranquil town to pieces. The Twenty-First
Georgia reluctantly advanced towards the town but fortunately for the spent men, saw no action. The
white flag was raised before the Trimble’s brigade was engaged. Almost immediately, orders came down
the line for the Georgians to fall in. The fetid and depleted Twenty-First Georgia started off the march as a
dragging column but in high spirits. Though only number around eighty effectives, the regiment was more
than ready to redeem their Second Manassas showing. But the unit knew nothing of the seriousness of the
situation down the road. General Lee, stunned at the situation that developed around South Mountain,
ordered his split forces to converge around a small farming town. With their backs against the Potomac
River and his forces now trickling in from all angles, Lee was determined to stand firm and salvage his
failing invasion of Maryland. Captain Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia reached their intended
position and laid in an open field of dirt. The regiment was soundly secured by rolling hills, limestone
outcroppings and a grand view of a huge cornfield. To the regiment’s right was a farmhouse that was set
ablaze by Confederate pickets, and to the Georgian’s immediate front, a wooded glen. Battle was
imminent.
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Chapter 8: The Battle of Antietam

Captain James Cooper Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia Infantry awoke on the morning of
September 17, 1862 to the sounds of Federal rifle fire to their front. Only one week away from his
twenty-third birthday, Nisbet had been campaigning as a junior officer in the Twenty-First Georgia for
nearly six months straight, a veteran of some of the most vicious combat of the war. The command of the
Georgians had been passed to him during the most difficult combat situations, and he and the TwentyFirst Georgia succeeded in completing their tasks as soldiers. At dawn, Federal artillery began shelling the
exposed Confederate positions posted around the fields and orchards beyond Sharpsburg. Confederate
batteries did their best to rebuttal but the concussion of the heavy ordinance, both Federal and
Confederate, shook both armies unmercifully. Caught between countless dueling batteries and out in the
open with little protection from the Federal and Confederate ordinance, Captain Nisbet and the other
officers of the Twenty-First Georgia ordered their companies to lay down behind any cover they could
find.164
The night before on September 16, General Issac Trimble’s Brigade had been deployed in the
fields and farm lane of the Mumma Farm. Two hundred yards ahead of Trimble’s position on that farm,
lay what the locals called the East Woods. The thin woodlot did not conceal the Federals as they pushed
out and into the open field towards the Georgian position. At 5:45am, the Federals advanced rapidly
towards Captain Nisbet’s vulnerable position behind a rail fence. Though exposed, some of the Georgians
were fortunate enough to find low limestone outcroppings, which offered some shelter from the
shelling. 165 Major Thomas Glover, commanding the Twenty-First Georgia, ordered the Georgians to
commence firing on the advancing Federals. The Federal brigade Trimble’s men were up against, were
General Truman Seymour’s vaunted Pennsylvania Bucktails. General Seymour had equipped his
regiments with breechloading Sharps rifles, which created a severe and constant fire that the Georgians
struggled in replicating.166
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Captain Nisbet crouched along his company, directing fire and shouting encouragement to his
men as they responded in vain to the seemingly continuous Federal fire. Nisbet drew up alongside to a
peculiar man on the regiment’s firing line. The captain huddled close by and offered encouragement to the
solider but also warned him to keep covered.167 Regrettably, Nisbet’s warnings went unheard as the man
was soon a casualty to the intense Federal rifle fire. Captain Nisbet called for a stretcher, shouldered the
man’s rifle, and contrary to junior officer behavior tried to exhaust the man’s remaining rounds. He
attempted to lead by example but all the while made sure his men kept up their fire, multitasking as a
rifleman and officer. By joining the firing line, a junior officer immediately attracted the trust of their
men. This demonstrated that the junior officer was willing to excuse orders along side the common
soldier.168 The importance of a soldier’s trust within the junior officer reserve was critical to the
functionality of a Civil War unit. Attention to the details of battle was also imperative to the survival of a
unit, as the Sharps rifles that Seymour’s Federals held used up copious amounts of ammunition.
Consequently, Seymour’s Brigade was forced to exit the field only after a short demonstration. With no
orders to withdraw, the Georgians braced themselves again for the redeployment of the Federals to their
front. Fatigued but determined to hold the position on the Mumma Farm, Captain Nisbet felt the fight
with Seymour’s Brigade had lasted three-hours, though it was only 6:00 am. 169
Major Rufus Dawes, a veteran of two months of heavy combat, knew his regiment’s ability and
expected extreme competence from his men in combat. General Joesph Hooker’s I Corps’ initial attacks
towards the Dunker Church had stalled. The Iron Brigade stepped into position along side the Joesph
Poffenberger Farm. Confederate artillery fire skipped into the ranks and flank of the Midwestern brigade,
but they remained at attention. Dawes knew the men had complete trust in their commanders, right down
to the junior officers. The only thing to hold any concern over was ones survival. Orders to advance
reached the Sixth Wisconsin and the Iron Brigade stepped off in columns of division with Major Dawes
and Sixth Wisconsin in the lead. To attest to the severity of the artillery fire, a shot exploded amidst front
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ranks of the Sixth Wisconsin, killing and wounding eleven of the Midwesterners.170 However, the
collective idea of professionalism railed the stunned lines as the regiment closed-up ranks and advanced
in good order.171 The proficiency of its soldiers and officers prove to be indispensable for the brigade that
morning. Absorbing shot and shell, the Sixth Wisconsin maneuvered through a shallow strip of woods and
deployed into a line of battle. Watches read 6:15 am.
The smoke from the rifles and countless Federal and Confederate guns clouded the area around
the East Woods and the Mumma Farm. General Truman Seymour’s Brigade did not renew their attack on
General Issac Trimble’s Brigade, leaving Captain James Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia time to
recuperate. Major Thomas Glover returned from a rendezvous with General Trimble’s staff and informed
the Twenty-First Georgia’s junior officers that the regiment was to make a run for the fence line bordering
the Smoketown Road to the left of their present position. The regiment had to oblique left, take up a
position behind the fence that bordered the road and assist the fight in the cornfield beyond. Federal
brigades were observed by the staff rapidly advancing through the trampled corn stalks.
But before the order to advance to the Smoketown Road was to be arranged, Major Glover went down
with a severe wound. Command of the Twenty-First Georgia one agin fell into the hands of Captain
James Nisbet at a critical moment in combat.172
Major Rufus Dawes looked on as Captain John Kellogg and Company I of the Sixth Wisconsin
dashed for the Miller Farmhouse.173 In order to press the advance of the Iron Brigade, the Confederate
sharpshooters who had taken position inside the Miller’s home, had to be driven back. Artillery fire still
raked the halted column, as Company I sorted through the orchards and outbuildings of the farm. Major
Dawes patiently waited for Kellogg’s company to finish their work, but Lt. Colonel Edward Bragg, still in
regimental command, grew irritated and ordered the right wing of the Sixth Wisconsin opposite the
Hagerstown Pike. The movement left Major Dawes in charge of the Sixth’s left wing. Upon completion of
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clearing the Miller homestead, Major Dawes ordered his group forward and through the farm, making
sure to keep a tight hold to their flank along the Hagerstown Pike.
“As soon as we left the rock fence, our object was defined; the enemy, in the woods to our front,
opened up on us.” Captain James Nisbet recalled as the Twenty-First Georgia broke for the Smoketown
Road.174 The remnants of Seymour’s Brigade to their right flank, along with a New York regiment to their
front-right, caught the Georgians in the midst of their advance. The contesting Federals opened up a
terrible fire into the Georgians. Nisbet, attempting to lead by example, was one of the first to attempt the
dash. The captain felt a blow to his chest, and toppled over rails and into the road. Although sprawled out
and unconscious, the Georgians followed his lead and scaled the fence into their new position along the
Smoketown Road.175 “I recovered my senses in a few minutes.” remembered Nisbet. The captain checked
himself and found no blood but saw that his sword clasp ad been badly dented by a ball. Recalling in his
memoirs, Nisbet vouches that “you don’t hear the one that hits you.” 176 Many a soldier attested to
Nisbet’s recollection of that day. Transitory to nearly being a casualty moments before, Nisbet scrambled
over to the fence where his regiment held their new skirmish line.177 It was here where Captain Nisbet
found Lieutenant Blevins kneeling behind his company as they fired into a Federal regiment attempting to
advance out of the Cornfield to their front. However, a round exiting the vortex, hit the junior officer in
the shoulder. Captain Nisbet informed him where the field hospital was located and watched the young
officer miraculously escaping death as he wandered incoherently to the rear.178 As Nisbet attempted to
assess the situation to his front, one of his captains crawled over to him and inquired if Lieutenant Blevins
was well. But before the captain finished his thought, a round found his opened mouth. Nisbet scrambled
over once again to another critically wounded junior officer in an attempt at triage, propped the officer's
head up on a cartridge box.179 While caring for his wounded, Captain Nisbet failed to recognize the
situation. But Nisbet’s men fought well without close guidance and drove the Federal back into the woods

174
175
176
177
178
179

Nisbet, Four Years On The Firing Line, 153.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid,.154.
Ibid. The captain would survive the gruesome wound.

THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

54

and corn. As Nisbet resumed his duty, of regimental command, his line began echoing the shouts of a
retreating enemy. 180
Major Rufus Dawes ordered his lead company through the Miller’s garden fence. The men had
difficulty pulling the fence down so orders were given to his good friend Captain Edwin Brown to take
point and lead his company single-file through the gate. Captain Brown began to shout “Company E! on
the right, by file into…” but was killed by a round through the open mouth before consummating the
command.181 Having no time to mourn his friend’s death, Dawes urged his men on through the opening
and recalled that “the men scrambled over the briars and flower beds in the garden” in an attempt to
resurge the stalled advance.182 The right of the Sixth Wisconsin under Lt. Colonel Bragg was still
positioned across the pike when a powerful volley from the Confederates in the woods to their front
staggered the Federal advance. 183 In thinking his own left wing in danger of being cut-off from the rest of
the regiment, Major Dawes ordered his men slow the advance in order to reattach with the right of the
regiment. Orders were given to lay down amongst the cornstalks.184 Confederate rifle fire became
increasingly intense and the artillery began the switch to canister, as the Iron Brigade aligned well into its
effective range. Two officers posted next to Major Dawes were badly wounded by canister fire, as both
wings of the Sixth Wisconsin ground to a halt. Sergeant-Major Howard Huntington found Dawes and
informed him that Lt. Colonel Bragg immediately requested he meet him at the fence along the
Hagerstown Pike.185 Dawes made it to his commander but found Bragg clutching his side and bleeding
profusely. Major Dawes immediately ordered two men to take his friend to the rear.
Finding himself in command of the regiment, Major Dawes observed the woods to the right of the
Sixth Wisconsin’s position at the turnpike. A group of daring Confederate officers on horseback presented
themselves close to the regiment's front as the Sixth Wisconsin hugged the ground. Finding the scene
180

Nisbet, Four Years On The Firing Line, 154. The Twenty-First Georgia was drawing fire from Duryea’s Federal brigade from
the edge of the Cornfield as well as from a scattering of Federals reluctantly holding on to the edge of the East Woods to the
Twenty-First’s immediate right. The idea for Major Glover to shift his position is interesting to say the least. Being literally in the
Smoketown Road, their right was exposed so much so that the Federals could shoot right down the command line and take out
the officers as they directed the Georgians, which can attest to the two men Nisbet took care of as his men battled Duryea’s
Brigade.
181 Carman, The Maryland Campaign, 221. Dawes, Service With the Sixth Wisconsin, 88.
182 Ibid., 88-89.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid., 222. Ibid.

THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

55

rather irritating, Major Dawes snatched a rifle from a soldier and upon resting it upon on one of the rail
posts “…fired six shots at the group…” while his men handed him their muskets.186 This scene
undoubtedly stimulated regiment’s fighting spirit and shook them out their complacency with the ground.
The Sixth Wisconsin began responding to the Confederate volleys with a rapid fire of their own. Although
Major Dawes was pleased with the rate of fire, the position of the regiment was exposed and an advance
was necessary if any of his men were going to survive the battle. The rest of the Iron Brigade caught up to
the Sixth Wisconsin and the entirety of the unit aligned. Major Dawes looked to his left and observed Lt.
Colonel Thomas Allen of the Second Wisconsin motioning for Dawes to advance the Sixth Wisconsin.
The two regiments began forward in an attempt to exit the cornfield.187
The Second and Sixth Wisconsin neared the edge of the cornfield. The Confederate fire was so
intense that the men moved forward at a lean, as if against a strong wind. When reaching the edge of the
cornfield, the advance stopped abruptly as a concealed line of Confederates drew up from the sloping
ground and volleyed into the the Second and Sixth Wisconsin. Major Dawes infamously recalled that his
“men, I cannot say fell; they were knocked out of the ranks by the dozens.”188 At this point in their
enduring history, the Iron Brigade stood toe-to-toe with the finest regiments the Confederate Army could
muster up. At Second Manassas the brigade refused to be moved. At South Mountain, the brigade refused
to slow down their advance. The professionals of the steady unit seemingly automatically redressed
following the volley and returned fire at the Confederate line. The lines of battle reminiscently morphed
again into a disorganized group, much akin to formation Major Dawes recalled the unit fought as at
Brawner Farm. The Fourteenth Brooklyn stepped into the ranks of the Sixth Wisconsin. Both regiments
fired together into the Confederates who held their ground only thirty yards away from the cornfield. 189
Major Dawes viewed his regiment fighting frantically, and in an odd state. “A great hysterical
excitement… and reckless regard of life…” took over skirmish line.190 The intermingled Wisconsin and
New York lines passed forward, seemingly out of necessity. The ranks held together only by the
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toughness of the men and the idea of killing those who killed them. Major Dawes observed the
Confederate fire had slackened and ordered his seemingly crazed regiment forward. The massed lines
pushed the exhausted Confederates over the rail fence that bordered the Hagerstown Pike. 191 Dawes
remained with his line, shouting and encouraging the great fire being dealt upon the shattered
Confederates. Yet the Confederate line still had fight and staggered the reckless advance of the
intermingled Federals. Major Dawes ordered a temporary withdraw back behind the rail fence in the
cornfield to regroup his messed command.
From the cover of a piled up rail fence, the mass of confused units, both Federal and Confederate,
continued to punish one another for their sin of existence. General John Gibbon somehow observed the
stalled advance through the smoke and ordered two guns up and into the Hagerstown Pike. Stewart’s
Battery veered off west form the Hagerstown Pike to take advantage of the high ground along side the
pike.192 Coming into battery, the honorary members of the Iron Brigade shot into a rallied Confederate
battle line leaving the West Woods, in an attempt to relieve the stranded Confederate units seeking cover
along the pike’s fence line. Unfortunately, assistance did not reach them. Federal sharpshooters, infantry,
and now artillery all converged on the dejected Confederates. What was left of the Confederate firing line
was routed as they broke and ran for the cover of the West Woods.
Major Dawes and Sixth Wisconsin bounded out of the cover in an attempt to converge their fire
into the retreating Confederate line. “We all joined together, jumped over the fence, and again pushed out
into the open field” Dawes recalled.193 The strange state of Major Dawes command still remained in an
odd way. The mental fatigue of death weighed heavily on the men in the ranks. Tears flowed freely down
faces, and some laughed hysterically. A few were hit but did not fall, advancing yards on purely on
adrenaline, shock, or denial before finally dropping or turning to the rear.194 The Confederates franticly
dove over the pike fences in an effort to escape the chaos, only to be blindsided by the Nineteenth Indiana
and Seventh Wisconsin storming out of the West Woods. A fierce slaughter at the Hagerstown Pike ensued
as both sides fought for their lives. Though just as soon as it begun, the Sixth Wisconsin, Fourteenth
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Brooklyn, Eighty Fourth New York, and the Second Wisconsin leaped to their feet and pushed up to
nearly two hundred yards away from the Dunker Church.195
Confederate General John Bell Hood’s Texas Brigade stampeded into the clover fields beyond the
Dunker Church. The Texans and Georgians were lived after their breakfast was disturbed by the Iron
Brigade’s relentless advance. Unfortunately, Major Dawes noticed that the intermingled command’s rifles
were extensively fouled after rapid firing, thus preventing the Federals from sending the rabid Texans a
volley before their withdrawal. Someone in the intermingled ranks yelled “now save who can!” and the
Federal units sprinted to the shelter of the Cornfield. 196 Major Dawes led his regiment back into the
flattened corn, but a spent ball hit his calve as he leapt over a fence. Ignoring the wound, Dawes kept his
mind steady. Leaving the field was out of the question that morning.
The wrecked Federal advance attempted to rally in the center of Miller’s Cornfield. The color
guard of the Sixth Wisconsin especially felt the fury of Hood’s Texans. Observing that a complete route of
his unit very likely, Major Dawes grabbed the regimental flag and waved it defiantly, shouting rallying
cries to any man that crossed him. Fully understanding that by grabbing the flag, death usually followed
close by, Major Dawes decided that he would die right there rather than see his beloved men taken
prisoner.197 But, through the desperate situation, his men still rallied around the banner.
The guns that supported the Iron Brigade’s advance began to fall silent. Horses and gunners were
hit especially hard as the Confederate counterattack threatened to capture Gibbon’s beloved bronze
trophies. General Gibbon, a former artillerist had been assisting in sighting his Battery B Fourth U.S
Artillery when he observed Major Dawes rallying his men close by.198 Orders shouted at Dawes to save
the guns drew the major’s attention. Dawes and his small band ran for the road where the guns stood idol.
“Let every man from Wisconsin follow me!” Major Dawes ordered.199 Generals sighing artillery and
majors were waving regimental flags. The Midwesterners were determined to hold onto their guns, which
always served them well. The Texans advanced only forty yards away just as the guns unloaded a salvo
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that launched the top of the rail fence along with a company of Texans into the air.200 Major Dawes
looked around at his command, as thunderclaps of double canister stunned him. However, the major
remained next to his men, determined to try to salvage the ground his men so valiantly held.201
Captain James Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia held onto the Smoketown Road desperately
when Hood’s Texans hauled up and over the exhausted regiment. Captain Nisbet made the decision to
follow alongside the attack, and given the regiments propensity to rapidly move ordered an advance in an
open-order. This maneuver allowed each man to advance towards cover in scattered formation. 202
Recalling the devastation the fire had been while leaping the fence along the road an hour before, Captain
Nisbet ordered once the regiment reached the confides of the East Woods, that everyone, officers
included, were to find a tree to draw the Federal fire. In Captain Nisbet’s opinion, this would stall the
advance of the enemy, and if necessary, let his men withdraw at their own desired pace. Nisbet had
learned that “discretion is the better part of valor” in combat, as he understood.203 To lead recklessly
would not win the war and only cost you lives.
The Twenty-First Georgia entered the East Woods with the Fourth Alabama on their left and the
Fifth Texas on their right.204 General Jospeh Mansfield’s Federal XII Corps sluggishly moved into
position to the Confederate front at a piecemeal rate. Mansfield’s green troops hardly deployed into a line
of battle when Captain Nisbet ordered his veteran regiment to fire at will. The precise fire, unleashed by
Nisbet’ staggered regiment positioned behind trees and neatly stacked wood, completely stalled the
Federal advance. Nisbet recalls that in a such a calm manor, the Georgians were free to pick their targets
and enact their revenge upon the raw Federal formations.205 It was 8:30 am, when the Twenty-First
Georgia finally withdrew after General John Bell Hood’s Texas Brigade’s advance was routed.. 206 Captain
James Nisbet ordered the retreat of his regiment, and sprinting as fast as they could across the hard-fought
ground they previously occupied reached safety around the Dunker Church. The Twenty-First Georgia
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had been in constant combat for nearly four hours. Though Captain James Nisbet acted superbly as
interim commander of the Twenty-First Georgia, he could not prevent the seventy-one casualties that the
bloodiest day had wrought upon the already withered unit.207 North of the Dunker Church, the Sixth
Wisconsin and the Iron Brigade held on to General John Gibbon’s guns. Major Rufus Dawes and what
was left of his inherited command had reached the apex of exhaustion. Behind the cover the North
Woods, the Midwesterners attempted to figure their losses. Of its 314 effectives, only 162 rallied at the
end of the day on September 17. 208
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Chapter 9: Conclusion

The Battle of Antietam provided an utterly demoralizing outcome for both Union and
Confederate armies. Though President Abraham Lincoln used the tactical draw as a platform to release
the Emancipation Proclamation, the state of many of the combatants were far too enervated to
comprehend the political importance at the moment. To describe the solider’s physical state as worn out
after Antietam is an understatement. Major Rufus Dawes identifies the environment of the Sixth
Wisconsin as “…in a condition of exhaustion” as well as “…in very bad condition for active service.”209
According to Dawes, the regiment had been the target of enemy fire for eleven straight days before the
climactic battle at Antietam Creek.210 Not only did battle demand a tax on the solider’s physical stability,
but demanded the solider’s mental sanity as well. Major Dawes suffered from migraine headaches for
weeks after the battle. 211 The regiment was in a state of gloom and despair after witnessing the
devastation while advancing through Miller’s Cornfield, which undoubtedly added to Dawes’ and
countless other participants pain.
Captain James Nisbet was in a similar way. As what was left of the Twenty-First Georgia
regrouped around Dunker Church, the adrenaline depleted in the young captain. Nisbet collapsed into a
state of nausea.212 The painful bruising of his solar plexus was too much for him to bear any longer. As he
involuntary curled up into fetal-position, Nisbet’s friend Bill Stewart from the Sixth Georgia ran up to the
vulnerable junior officer. Stewart loosened Nisbet’s essentials in an effort to comfort the captain. In doing
so, a flattened round fell from Nisbet’s sword clasp.213 Later that night, Captain Nisbet made his way to a
field hospital a few miles away from Sharpsburg at Shepperdstown. Through he was unfit for duty, Nisbet
limped around searching for his wounded comrades. Upon finding them, he encouraged them with well
wishes.214 At the makeshift hospital, Nisbet came across the soldier whom he requisitioned the rifle from
along the Smoketown Road fence. The Captain was amused to see that the man was fine, despite being
shot through the abdomen. Another surprise bestowed Nisbet when he found the poor captain who
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suffered that horrible head wound, alive but painfully swollen. Both of Nisbet’s men would survive their
gruesome wounds.215 Captain Nisbet continued to make rounds, checking on his wounded men and
assisting when he could, doing his duty as he struggled to stay up-right.
The Summer of 1862 passed by quickly for the embattled Americans. The winter mixture of navy
and sky-blue overcoats were thrown on as the new Army of the Potomac commander, General Ambrose
Burnside, waited incessantly on the banks of the Rappahannock River, across from Fredericksburg,
Virginia. For Major Rufus Dawes, impending battle approached the Iron Brigade again, and the men were
less than enthused about the prospect. The Antietam fog still lingered over the brigade. Through most of
the Sixth Wisconsin’s wounded officer corps returned for duty, they were not at all healthy or fit. The
frigid temperature did not help to comfort the still raw wounds many held. A new addition to the brigade
came in form of a rather obnoxious but entertaining regiment of Michiganders. The Twenty-Fourth
Michigan was overly-eager to engage in battle. Not yet understanding the Army’s lack of effort in food
quality or distribution, the Twenty-Fourth Michigan chanted “Bread!” at the top of their lungs all the way
to Fredericksburg. Much to the veterans of the brigade amusement, they did not show a sign of fatigue in
doing so.216 Upon arrival at Fredericksburg, the rest of the brigade was more than happy to let them go in
and cover themselves with all the glory they could possibly absorb.217
On December 13, 1862 Major Rufus Dawes and the Sixth Wisconsin watched as the TwentyFourth Michigan rapidly cleared a wooded area to the brigade’s left. The entirety of the Iron Brigade
stepped off towards the Confederate guns which bristled the heights beyond their position. Major Rufus
Dawes systematically led his wing as Confederate artillery shelled the ground ahead of the regiment. The
Confederate ordnance began to hit too close to the fatigued battle line, and the brigade as a whole,
dropped into a depression after advancing only a few hundred yards.218 To the misfortune of the Sixth
Wisconsin, the depression was filled knee-deep with water, adding to the cold and annoyed state of the
soldiers.219 The Sixth Wisconsin watched the fight a few hundred yards ahead push back and forth until a
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Confederate counter attack pushed down a slope and into a rail embankment which sheltered a union
brigade from Confederate artillery fire.
The Twenty-First Georgia advanced down the steep towards the rail tracks which harbored
Federal’s seeking cover from the counter attack. Captain James Nisbet fired his pistol wildly into and over
any blue thing that moved. 220 Leading his company from the front, Captain Nisbet recalled ramming the
heal of his boot into the head of a Yankee officer and buried the cowering man into the mud.221 His men
followed just as aggressively but were startled as they realized they were outnumbered severely. The
Twenty-First Georgia began swinging wildly at everything, optioning to use whatever strength and
aggressiveness they had left to beat submission into the fledgling Federals.222 Another Confederate line
approached and the exhausted Federals surrendered their position. Captain James Nisbet and his company
dwelled along the rail bed in an exhausted state. Only a few hundred yards away, Major Rufus Dawes and
the Sixth Wisconsin lay prone in line of battle, but with no desire or orders to press their advance.223
The Battle of Fredericksburg was an overwhelming and decisive victory for the Confederate
Army, which closed out the first year of Major Rufus Dawes and Captain James Nisbet’s military career.
The engagement marked a turning point in the two junior officer’s military careers. The successful
leadership ability in which they both held, was not God-given, nor were the men born with the ability, but
rather their traits were learned. Dawes and Nisbet educated themselves in haste as battle developed, and
along with their fortune to learn along side an outstanding cast of officers taught themselves rapidly to
lead in a decisive manor. In Major Rufus Dawes and Captain James Nisbet’s first experience with combat,
there are similarities but also vast differences that would play a part in the sculpting of each individual’s
command style.
By the time Rufus Dawes entered his first combat situation at Second Manassas, James Nisbet
was already a veteran of two major military campaigns. During General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s
Shenandoah Valley campaign, the Federal Army offered a poor fight as well as displaying atrocious
command stability for most of the engagements. Captain Nisbet observed that it was rather easy to push
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the enemy from the field, let alone totally route the foe. As the result, Nisbet had the ability to practice his
observation and control of the situation, as well as instruct the placement of his men with clear
communication between he and his company. Nisbet’s company understood that the officers would
consistently display a coherent understanding of the battle, and in turn all what was expected from them
was a rapid execution of their orders.
The defining characteristic of General Stonewall Jackson’s military strategy was the idea of
getting at the enemy with speed along with brute force. Aggressiveness served as a substitute for inferior
troop numbers and stabilized his theory of offense is the best defense. This served as Jackson’s mantra for
the majority of his time in command. Captain James Nisbet displayed and understanding of this military
theory, but only to a certain extent. During the Peninsula Campaign, Nisbet was apt to quickly realize that
the ability to adapt to the situation as it presented itself in battle did prove to be a better play in most
combat situations. Jackson’s theory, as we now well know, caused incredible numbers of casualties, all
the while only adding to the difficulties the Confederacy had in replacing the lost numbers. The concern
Nisbet harbored was more of a personal matter. He cared for the wellness and the lives of his men. To he,
it was a job for the junior officer to place his command in the proper place so unnecessary casualties
would not accumulate. This idea is exercised first by Nisbet at Gaines’ Mill, when command of the
Twenty-First Georgia first placed in his command. Nisbet’s immediate idea to pull-out of a worsening
situation which contributed unnecessary casualties to his unit proved to be a wise order. Nisbet also
understood that leaving the cover of the creek’s bank, in an effort to continue the charge also could prove
to be a catastrophic mistake. In order to exercise command of the situation, Nisbet rather came to the
conclusion to pull the regiment back a short distance in an effort to consolidate and issue orders more
conclusively.
At Gaines’ Mill, the Confederate forces were not amalgamated until hours after the battle had
begun. Captain Nisbet and countless other veteran junior officers understood by the looks of the
piecemeal attacks, the high command did not have a correct idea of what was before them. It would be up
to the junior officers to control the flow of battle until the brass could sort out their differences. As Nisbet
redeployed the Twenty-First Georgia into combat, he chose to execute what is now know as suppressive
fire. It is not known if Nisbet knew of this term at this point of history, but the order helped the Georgians
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in gaining a foothold on the banks of the creek. Concentrating every shot, rather than ordering a charge in
reckless manor towards an entrenched enemy, proved to be the better choice given the circumstances at
hand. The maneuver provided much needed time for piecemeal reinforcements to arrive as well as
assisted in a surge that pushed the Federals off of the high ground.
The surge came in the form of General John Bell Hood’s Texas Brigade, who charged
haphazardly into the fray. Though losing a large amount of good men, they eventually punctured the
Federal line with the help of Nisbet and other regiments. Those who wrestled a point of support away
from the stubborn Federals would be in the shadow of the wanton Texan charge. This was to be Captain
Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia’s first chaotic situation. It would have been easy for Nisbet’s
command to be chewed up in the face of that extreme dense Federal position. But Nisbet opted to throw
out the idea of pushing toward the fortified enemy, and rather decided to establish a firing line. Nisbet
exercised observation and placement of his regiment wonderfully, given the desperate situation. Saving a
number of his men’s lives in a time where destruction of regiments was all too commonplace in the
Confederate Army.
Gaines’ Mill was a trying trial for Captain James Nisbet. It is clear that he understood that in the
thick of battle, decisions had to be made without clearance from generals who could hardly keep tabs on
the movement of their units in the ensuing chaos. The Confederate Army command structure proved to be
much more disorganized than that of their foe. Major Rufus Dawes was fortunate to have a competent
command structure in his brigade. This was made evident as the Sixth Wisconsin stood toe-to-toe with
Stonewall Jackson’s entire corps at Second Manassas. Major Dawes was not yet a veteran at Second
Manassas, though his brigade commander General John Gibbon was. Through outnumbered and rather
exposed in their position, the Iron Brigade held its ground in a stubborn fashion, unknown to the
Confederates at the time. General Gibbon expected a successful outcome and his expectations were only
executed because of his junior officer’s competency.
As General Jackson’s Corps rolled carelessly towards the Sixth Wisconsin, Colonel Lysander
Cutler, Lt. Colonel Edward Bragg and Major Rufus Dawes held literally an extremely exposed position.
Through the regiment’s accurate rifle fire stymied the Confederate advance, the Wisconsin men remained
needlessly exposed, but with little option to disperse into cover. Major Dawes and the regimental
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command decided to take up a more conservative prone position. Where tactics of the day wanted
standing, close-massed units, the result often went as expected. In observing their position as foolish
within minutes into their first battle, and with withdraw not an option, Major Dawes and his constituents
displayed the will to fight as smartly as the situation offered. Unfortunately the field of battle did not offer
much for both Federal and Confederate forces, and the stubbornness of both armies resulted in many
pointless casualties. This is observed in Captain James Nisbet’s command. Nisbet did not have the
command of the Twenty-First Georgia during Second Manassas. All he and his fellow junior officers were
able to order was to use any obstacle available to hide behind. The Twenty-First Georgia was decimated
by repeated foolish charges ordered by its regimental commander. Following his command decisions at
Antietam, this resonated with Nisbet deeply. While Nisbet silently protested recording the debacle, Major
Rufus Dawes observed what not to do in a fight. Cover was imperative to success as well as survival. He
understood there was to be no glory in being added to a casualty list following the battle. Much like
Nisbet and the Twenty-First Georgia, Dawes and the Sixth Wisconsin did not have the luxury of cover
imperative for survival. Instead, the Sixth Wisconsin opted to keep as close to the ground as they could
for the most of the battle, affirming the fierceness of the fighting in which they faced in every engagement
that the unit played a part in.
Observation was keen in the minds of Major Dawes and Captain Nisbet throughout their combat
service. Both exercised a common sense of the correct thing to do in moments of uncertainty. The ability
to rely on general officers to direct them was a rare in circumstance, leaving the direction of battle in the
hands of junior officers, as their units had been at Gaines’ Mill, Second Manassas and Antietam. The
confusion was much too dense, often leaving field officers to learn by trial and error. However, the
repercussions of error would be in lives, a toll that would prove costly for the veteran junior officers
mentally, as the war progressed. But even when presented with seemingly impossible situations in
combat, both Dawes and Nisbet somehow escaped unscathed, physically. Notwithstanding, the mental
state of the officers labored severely as exhaustion and shock overcame their bodies. By the time the
junior officers made their way out of the maelstrom of Antietam, their emotions became circumscribed
into a haze. Dawes and Nisbet saw their commands reduced to that of the size of a company. Soldiers
who were more like brothers were cut out of their lives instantly. This was much different than that of a
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death of a single family member. It could be counted as the deaths of tens of family members all at once.
However, both Dawes and Nisbet had to remain in control. It was important for those who remained not
to see the pessimistic and physical cracks forming in their leadership.
Major Dawes and Captain Nisbet are also atypical cases of gender rolls at this time in history.
Both Northern and Southern men both entered the war with a sense of extreme self-worth and an
honorable name to protect. For the Southern soldier, honor was the cornerstone to their existence. Both
Dawes and Nisbet hailed from similarly deep and patriotic family lines. However, the importance of their
families heritage did not effect their immediate command style. It is doubtful that Captain Nisbet thought
of his Scotch-Irish heritage as he lay along the Smoketown Road at Antietam. Both men had a deepened
sense of duty, but their allegiance stood with their comrades rather than their family name. To lead to the
best of their ability and lead their men out of combat safely became the overall purgative.
There are vast differences between Major Rufus Dawes and Captain James Nisbet in the realm of
subordinates. Dawes had the ability to rely on many officers who were as competent in battle as he. To
have the trust in fellow junior officers to execute as ordered proved vital to the Sixth Wisconsin’s success
in battle. While Captain Nisbet did have functional leaders in the junior officer ranks, most did not prove
their worth as he or his superior Major Thomas Glover consistently did in combat. The proof is the
delegation of command to Nisbet, who was not near the senior in rank. Although Nisbet would accept the
duty of regimental command multiple times in tough situations, he could not hope for the chance to lead
the regiment full-time. However, Rufus Dawes had this chance, and eventually found himself as
Lieutenant Colonel of the Sixth Wisconsin at Gettysburg.
The bureaucracy that plagued the Confederate Army’s promotion system, resulted in many
misplaced officers in command of men whom they should never have had jurisdiction over in the first
place. After the Battle of Fredericksburg, and seeing no future of promotion in a company-sized regiment,
Captain James Nisbet made his way to Richmond in an effort to ask for permission to raise a regiment on
his own. Using what prominence and pull his family had left, Nisbet was granted the opportunity to raise
the Sixty-Sixth Georgia Infantry for service in the Western Theater of the Confederate Army.224 Colonel
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James Cooper Nisbet served through the rest of the war, even serving as a temporary brigade commander
at the Battle of Chattanooga.225 In the defense of Atlanta, Nisbet’s military career came to a close as he
was captured by an Ohio regiment and sent to Johnston’s Island Prison for the remainder of the war.
Lieutenant Colonel Rufus Dawes did not meet such a distasteful fate. Dawes performed
remarkably at Gettysburg, doing his part in the capture of an entire Mississippi regiment while once again
foolishly waving the flag of his beloved Sixth Wisconsin. A year later, in the Summer of 1864, as he and
the Sixth Wisconsin settled into their entrenchments around Petersburg, Virginia, Dawes received horrible
news that his brother, Major Ephraim Dawes, had been horribly mangled in combat. His chin completely
carried away by a round while at the head of the Fifty-Third Ohio Infantry. After all the death and
destruction he had seen during the war, the sight of his younger brother struggling through gruesome
facial surgery was too much for Rufus Dawes.226 Having already lost too many bothers in service, Rufus
Dawes put in a request for a discharge. He would stay with his brother as he convalesced in Ohio.
It is important to stray away from beaten path of history and explore the stories of the regular
Americans who shaped the United States as it is today. In an effort to understand the who and why of this
major turning point in American history, as far as Civil War military history, observing the minor
characters in Civil War combat can assist in better understanding why a battle’s outcome harbored such a
result. Those who physically wrote the history can possibly unearth reasons why units behaved in such a
manor. Officers who led in battle can offer more information on why a combat situation’s outcome
occurred, especially when a general officer miles away removed, could barely understand such a situation
to their front. Though it is important to sort though those officers who create their own history just to save
face in order to understand an accurate depiction of history. The indispensable junior officer carried with
them into battle the faith of their men, the orders of their commander and the consequences of their
decisions. It was the junior officer who executed and directed in combat. Major Rufus Dawes and Captain
James Nisbet carried with them those often self-taught virtues of command, but the position also carried
the curse of benevolent compassion as well.
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